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ABSTRACT 
 
A NEW ROLE FOR BUSINESSES? 
ANALYZING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Sucuoğlu, Gizem 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Paul Williams 
September, 2002 
 
 
 This study analyzes the concept of corporate social responsibility related to 
Transnational Corporations (TNCs); why businesses are undertaking new 
responsibilities related to the social realm. As the power and visibility of TNCs have 
increased and their influence on society has grown, public expectations concerning 
their operations also rose. The constructivist theory of International Relations is used 
in order to approach the issues in a framework, and to be able to understand the 
future roles of businesses. The development of the concept as well as related legal 
and philosophical discussions are also included. Case studies have been used which 
have been analyzed using the theoretical framework explained at the beginning of the 
study. The aim of this study is to understand to what extent TNCs can be expected to 
adhere to the norm of corporate social responsibility. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
ŞİRKETLER İÇİN YENİ BİR ROL? 
KURUMSAL SOSYAL SORUMLULUK KAVRAMI 
Gizem Sucuoğlu 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Paul Williams 
Eylül 2002 
 
 
 Bu çalışma Çok Uluslu Şirketlerin (ÇUŞ) kurumsal sosyal sorumlulukları 
olması kavramını, yani şirketlerin neden sosyal alanda sorumluluklar üstlendiklerini 
incelemektedir. ÇUŞ’lerin gücü ve görünürlüğü arttıkça ve toplum üzerindeki etkileri 
büyüdükçe eylemlerine dair kamuoyu beklentileri de artmıştır. Bu konuları derli 
toplu bir çerçeve içinde ele almak ve şirketlerin gelecekteki rollerini daha iyi 
anlayabilmek amacıyla Uluslararası İlişkilerin konstruktivist teorisi kullanılmıştır. 
Bu kavramın gelişimi ile beraber hukuksal ve felsefi tartışmalar da çalışmada ele 
alınmıştır. Çalışmanın başında açıklanan teorik çerçeve kullanılarak incelenen pratik 
çalışmalar da yapılmıştır. Bu çalışmanın amacı ÇUŞ’lerin kurumsal sosyal 
sorumluluk normların uymalarının ne ölçüde beklenebileceğini anlamak amacını 
gütmektedir. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Throughout the 20th century and especially with the end of the Cold War, 
globalization, deregulation and the eroding of the nation state started to dominate the 
world political and economic agenda. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the 
end of the bipolar system, norms of free-market economy and human rights were 
percieved to be dominating the world system. At this time, the corporation had 
supposedly emerged as a rival to the nation state, not only in terms of financial 
wealth, but also in its ability to create jobs, investment and goods. Transnational 
corporations (TNCs) operating across borders, some wealthier than most developing 
countries, have been a salient focus of this debate.  
As the power and visibility of TNCs have increased and their influence on 
society has grown, public expectations concerning their operations also rose. With 
advances in communication technologies, information about the conduct of many of 
these huge companies, especially in the developing world were publicized. As the 
norm of human rights has become increasingly prominent, the involvement of many 
companies operating abroad in gross human rights abuses and environmental 
damages did not escape the attention of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the 
media and the general public. Many well known companies such as Shell, Nike and 
Nestlé have been the target of worldwide consumer boycotts, emphasizing their lack 
of responsibility towards the communities in which they operate.  
One reason for companies to invest abroad is to escape regulations in their 
home countries and operate under less strict environmental laws and less  stringent 
labor rights. However, there is a growing debate over whether TNCs have social 
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responsibilities independent from the laws under which they have been incorporated. 
The idea that transnational corporations do have social responsibilities to their host 
societies, namely, corporate social responsibility, is well known now. Contrary to the 
idea that the sole responsibility of businesses is to make profits within the law, 
corporate social responsibility rests on the stakeholder logic that they are responsible 
to employees, customers, communities, and everyone else that is affected by their 
actions, not only to their stockholders. Therefore, although there is no law regulating 
these activities, businesses have other reasons to be sensitive to human rights 
concerns, accept environmental responsibilities, and respond to the needs of the 
communities in which they operate. 
This human rights and environmental dimensions of responsibility place 
TNCs into the domain of International Relations, a field where the role of business is 
often underemphasized. IR scholars have mostly analyzed human rights from a statist 
point of view, although this is starting to change, as academic studies on TNCs are 
becoming more common (Pegg, 2000). The aim of this study is to analyze the notion 
of corporate social responsibility, especially the human rights implications of TNCs, 
from an IR perspective, to assess the the concept of corporate social responsibility in 
terms of its grounding, whether TNCs can be expected to undertake non-binding 
responsibilities in human rights, environmental preservation and societal 
involvement. 
In this study, the constructivist theory of IR will be used to analyze these 
issues and to understand the future role of businesses better. The first chapter begins 
by explaining Constructivist models developed in order to analyze how norms of 
human rights come into existence and become internalized. Most of the studies of the 
type take states as units of analysis. However, since there is no implication that these 
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models are created solely for states, this study extends them to include TNCs. Norms 
of human rights are subsumed within the scope of norms of corporate social 
responsibility. Based on IR constructivism, the following chapters will explain the 
process of norm emergence, adaptation and internalization, specifically, what the 
norms of corporate social responsibility involve, why businesses should adhere to 
these norms and if it is possible for them to be responsible actors on these terms. 
The second chapter reflects on the concept of responsibility and morality. It 
suggests that since there is yet no international law that regulates the operations of 
TNCs around the world, and corporate social responsibility mostly concerns 
corporations taking on responsibilities that are not legally binding, the corporation 
has to have the potential to behave “morally” or act responsibly. Afterwards, a 
historical background is provided both on how the concept of corporate 
responsibility came into being and how the corporation as a moral entity emerged. In 
the third section of this chapter, the degree to which law can regulate the behavior of 
TNCs and what can be extected from the TNC in terms of corporate responsibility is 
discussed. Finally, specific responsibilities attributable to corporations are 
enumerated, using the codes of conduct which companies publish and also those 
which are created by international organizations (IOs), business partnerships and 
non-governmental organizations. 
The third chapter is devoted to case studies. By using the Constructivist 
model, the responses of well-known TNCs to public expectations of them as 
responsible actors are analyzed. The goal of using case studies is to be able to fully 
understand what can be expected in behavioral terms from the emerging 
intersubjective understanding of corporate social responsibility. 
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The goal of this study is not to analyze all issues related to human rights and 
TNCs, but rather to understand how much TNCs can be expected to adhere to the 
norm of corporate social responsibility before making premature celebrations of 
corporations as responsible actors emerging as protectors of human rights and the 
environment and responding to societal needs on a global scale.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Theoretical Debates: Applications of the Constructivist Theory of 
International Relations 
 
1. The Constuctivist Theory of International Relations  
 
Corporate social responsibility is a salient issue today, featured in 
newspapers, business talks and academia. Many publications in International 
Relations have also evaluated this concept, as the debates on globalization and the 
erosion of the nation state proceed. In this study, this concept of corporate 
responsibility will be analyzed through the use of the constructivist theory of 
International Relations in order to frame the concept in such a way as to achieve 
greater understanding of the potential and limitations of the concept.  
Constructivism is one of the most important schools of thought in post-Cold 
War International Relations Theory. An old debate in International Relations is 
between agent-oriented approaches, which take rational actors as shaping social 
structures, and structurally-oriented ones, which adopt a reverse causality. 
Constructivism points out that the structure affecting the behaviors of actors may be 
social as well as material and economic; in fact social structures are often overriding. 
Socially constructed rules, principles, norms and shared beliefs may provide actors 
with understandings of what is valuable and how these valuable things may be 
attained (Finnemore, 1996: 16). Social norms, cultural rules and roles and historical 
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discourse may affect preferences and behavior. It should be noted that 
Constructivism is a social theory, not only a theory of international politics and it 
incorporates many concepts of sociology. 
One of the problems of applying this theory to companies is that IR 
Constructivism has been developed, mostly by taking the state as the actor to 
analyze. However, it is not purely a statist theory and one can also address the 
actions of transnational corporations using constructivist models. In particular, 
Constructivism helps explain why transnational corporations have shown similar 
patterns of behavior in the social and economic realms, without any legal obligation 
to do so. This theoretical approach, which explains patterns of behavior by referring 
to normative structures that construct the identities and interests of the actor, seems 
to be the best choice for this study. However, we need to discuss other theories of 
International Relations, mainly neorealism and neoliberalism, in order to make a 
proper comparison.   
Traditional schools of IR theory tend to emphasize material factors and 
instrumental motives when explaining the behavior of the actors concerned, while 
neglecting the social-interactional contexts of compliance. These approaches 
obviously cannot shed much insight into the study of corporate responsibility, 
especially if this concept is understood as a normative, rather than a legal, concept. It 
would be false to state that traditional theories such as Realism and Liberalism 
completely dismiss the existence of norms; however, they approach norms from the 
perspective of utilitarianism: compliance with norms is based on self-interested 
calculations (Smith, 1996: 229). These theories are also known as rationalist theories. 
The main points of rationalism are as follows. First of all, the identities and 
interests of the actors involved are exogenously given and not subject to change. 
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Moreover, rationalism tends to focus on the structure and/or the processes that lead 
to a certain behavior; in other words, there is no interaction between the actor and the 
structure or process. They cannot capture the intersubjective quality of norms. 
Finally, states are dominant in the rationalist theories of International Relations as 
actors working only towards the pursuit of self-interest (Wendt, 1992: 129).   
Realism defines international society as state-centric, and stresses that the 
nation state prevails over the relatively unenforceable nature of international law 
(Morgenthau, 1985: 252). The anarchical structure of international relations 
determines state action. For Realists, norms are rationalizations of self-interest and 
have no independent explanatory power.1 Moral laws are ineffective and 
international society does not operate within a framework of moral rules: 
“international morality as an effective system of restraints upon international policy 
becomes impossible” (Morgenthau, 1985: 248). The term “international society” is 
itself scrutinized, since “a formerly cohesive international society” has been 
fragmented into a “multiplicity of morally self-sufficient national communities, 
which have ceased to operate within a common framework of moral precepts. The 
transformation has weakened, to the point of ineffectiveness, the universal, 
supranational rules of conduct which before the age of nationalism had imposed a 
system of limitations upon the foreign policies of individual nations” (Morgenthau, 
1985: 252). Kenneth Waltz mentions states as relevant actors and believes in 
measuring capabilities in terms of power and specifying preferences in terms of 
maximizing capabilities (Finnemore, 1996: 10). This viewpoint provides an 
antithesis to the argument that transnational corporations can be subject to the mores 
of international society; first, because corporations are not seen as an element of 
                                                          
1 For further details, see Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 13 
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international society and second, because the norms of international society lack any 
mechanism of enforcement. Moreover, only simple learning and behavioral 
adaptation of actors are possible especially under Neorealism, according to 
Alexander Wendt, while complex learning that may lead to redefinitions of interests 
and identity is not mentioned (Wendt, 1992: 130). Complex learning and reshaping 
of identities and interests are important in our case since they have explanatory 
power, as we will see below. 
Neoliberal Institutionalism also shares the assumption of Realism that the 
international world is anarchic and composed of rational actors, but it believes that 
regimes, institutions and norms do have a constraining power over actors through 
monitoring and sanctions (Keohane, 1984: 112). Moreover, it is not structures but 
processes that influence the  behavior of actors in a cooperative direction (Wendt, 
1992: 130). In addition, complex learning that can lead to transformations of 
identities and interests is allowed (Wendt, 1992: 131). This approach is useful for 
this study, since it explains why actors can relinquish their short-term material 
interests for a longer-term material gain. TNCs give up short-term and engage in acts 
that will earn the company positive publicity that will transform into longer-term 
profit increases.  
However, Neoliberalism does not focus on the presence of global norms, 
choosing to explain norm compliance with respect to specific institutions and 
regimes (Shannon, 2000: 300). Therefore, this theory is related mainly to the 
calculations of material self interest, since the “benefits outweigh the opportunity 
cost of not acting on short-run interests” (Klotz, 1995: 457). It does not allow for the 
interaction between the process and the actor, since, as with Realism, identities are 
again given exogenously. The process that Neoliberalism describes has direct effect 
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only on the behavior of the actors, not on their identities. Actually, the fact that 
Neoliberalism is a rationalist approach limits its explanatory power here and one goal 
of Constructivism, as advanced by Alexander Wendt, is to free this theory from the 
constraining ties of rationalism.  
Constructivists focus on the role of social structures in compliance decisions, 
and assert that societal norms can exert powerful influence on the behavior of actors. 
The international system, including power relations, is taken to be comprised of 
constructed meanings and values. Normative structures identify what is and is not 
acceptable in international society. These structures, through which we organize our 
actions, are socially constructed by collective meanings that arise out of social 
interaction and that construct actors’ identities, which are in turn the basis of 
interests. Meanings arise out of social interaction. As long as actors are socialized 
and participate in collective systems of meaning, an institution – a stable set of role 
identities and interests – is formed, having a motivational force. “The process of 
creating institutions is one of internalizing new understandings of self and the other, 
of acquiring new role identities” (Wendt, 1992: 155). Institutions, defined as such, 
can explain changes in behavior.  
It is unfair to state that Constructivism neglects the material factors leading to 
compliance, although the approach has been criticized of giving the social factors too 
much emphasis in comparison to material factors. In the works of Klotz and 
Finnemore (Klotz, 1995: 1-30, Finnemore, 1996: 11-18) it is suggested that both 
factors matter when an actor is to make a choice. The difference is that, unlike 
rationalist approaches, Constructivism makes social factors a necessary part of the 
equation. One of the goals of Constructivism is to bridge the gap between social 
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theory and IR theory, between reflectivist theories and the rationalist theories2. For 
this reason, it is an “approach that tries to speak to both rationalist and reflectivist 
positions”3. The Constructivist argument is not that norms matter more than material 
interests do. It tries to improve or complement rationalist theories, not necessarily 
falsify them. 
The question to be answered is: Can an economic actor be expected to engage 
in certain activities for which it is not legally responsible, and which may not allow it 
to earn profits? This second issue that the corporation may act contrary to its interest 
in profits in certain cases - is crucial. TNCs will act to maximize profits regardless of 
whether it is imposed by law or not, but we have to test whether a real change in 
identity occurs, that leads corporations to balance their roles as profit-makers with 
communitarian responsibilities. Therefore, we shall take a look at certain studies that 
deal with reasons for compliance with norms. The emphasis has been on the 
emergence of norms over time and how these norms influence the behavior of actors. 
This study will focus on the “life-cycle” of norms especially on international human 
rights norms which have been schematised by these scholars (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998: 895). According to these approaches, norms can also be constitutive 
of identities and interests (Shannon, 2000: 296). Therefore, Constructivism intends to 
analyze not only the behaviors of the actors, but also changes in their identities, 
which are believed to be endogenous to interaction4. These studies provide us with a 
tool of considerable explanatory power, creating schemes for the comparative 
analysis of social norms and compliance, which are focused on their emergence and 
                                                          
2 Some versions of this reflectivist - rationalist dichotomy can be found in the works of Keohane, 
Wendt and Smith. 
3 Rationalist approaches refer to Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism whereas Reflectivist approaches 
refer to alternative theories such as Post-modernism, Feminism and Critical Theory. For further 
details, see Smith, International Theory, Positivism and Beyond, pp. 229 
4 For further details, see Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It,  pp. 132 
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prevalence as well as the actors involved in this process. Each study is supported by 
empirical evidence, which is also the methodological emphasis of this study.   
Constructivism is also more open to the inclusion of non-state actors in the 
study of International Relations. An intersubjective norm of sovereignty underlies 
state existence, which prevails in some issue areas of International Relations, but in 
other areas, such as trade, norms such as private property rights also contend for 
influence. These rights constitute and inform the behavior of non-state actors like 
firms, which are not confined to the territorial boundaries of the nation-state (Klotz, 
1995: 16-17). As stated above, according to Constructivism, international actors are 
socially constructed, their identities and interests are defined by norms varying over 
time. Therefore the concept of international system can be broadened, which is 
another reason that makes Constructivism appropriate to use in this study.   
One of the goals of this study is to determine how much explanatory power 
Constructivism has. Before applying constructivist theory to the particular cases, it 
will be useful to identify certain weaknesses associated with this approach. First of 
all, there is too much emphasis on the social environment and its influence on the 
behaviors of actors. Although Constructivism is helpful in putting emphasis on the 
role of normative structures, it is weak when explaining deviations in behavior and 
how a structure can affect actors differently. In other words, the theory helps to 
explain similarities in behavior much better than differences. Since the interpretation 
of international norms varies from actor to actor, there can be no single international 
normative structure within their perceptions. How an actor perceives the structure 
will have an impact on its behavior. Although the point that norms may have 
different impacts in different settings has been touched, how behaviors differ has not 
been analysed much (Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 2). Moreover, social factors and 
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understandings other than the norms in question can also influence actors, making 
normative influence hard to ascertain. Constructing responsibility on this imperfect 
normative background may be problematic, which is one of the issues that will be 
dealt with in this paper. This  problem also highlights some criticisms leveled against 
corporate social responsibility, since the  normative structure is not so clearly defined 
and thus, it is not  possible to base a clear definition of responsibility on this 
structure.  
Jeffrey Checkel, one of the leaders of this school, states that while 
Constructivists have been good at exploring the macro-foundations of politics and 
state behavior - rules, norms, culture and political discourse - less attention has been 
paid to how agents take action within these structures (Checkel, 1999: 1). The second 
part of constructivism, why actors abide by the norms embedded in regimes and 
international institutions is much more the focus of my concern, since I am trying to 
find out why transnational corporations choose to abide by certain normative 
structures when the legal basis for action is not clearly defined. 
 
2. Constructivism Applied to Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Norms are simply defined as shared and social understandings of behavior, 
such as “murder is wrong”, although they may not always be so clearly specified. 
Norms have two components important for this discussion: prescription and 
parameters. The prescription is the part of the norm informing actors what to do or 
not within their identity definition, such as “abusing human rights is not acceptable”. 
The parameters of a norm indicate under what situations the norm's prescription 
applies, such as under which conditions killing is bad and when it can be permissible. 
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The subjectivity of this approach is apparent (Shannon, 2000: 297). Therefore a norm 
will be violated only if the conditions where the act is understood as unacceptable are 
intersubjectively valid.  
When talking about norms, I am referring not only to those found in domestic 
and international law. Ethical regimes differ to a great extent from legal systems. 
They are not created through contracts between states and do not provide any 
material incentives for cooperative behavior. Hence, these must not be confused in 
any circumstances with the solid, non-voluntary, all-encompassing and enforceable 
character of the law. However, many latent rules, patterns, expectations and the 
individual and societal conceptions of morality play an important role in defining the 
behavior of actors. Why an actor complies with a norm is often hard to determine: is 
it because of a strong belief in the norm, consistently material incentives to comply 
with that norm or just habit?  
Ethan Nadelman talks about a particular category of norms that prohibit the 
involvement of both states and non-state actors in particular activities (Nadelman, 
1990: 479), such as slavery, trafficking of women and children and killing 
endangered species. States, communities and individuals condemn those who refuse 
to comply with these norms. Nadelman refers to both the substance of these norms 
and the processes through which they are enforced as “global prohibition regimes”. 
These regimes, involving both legal and normative enforcement measures are crucial 
since they create an element of standardization and an expectation of cooperation. 
Global prohibition regimes emerge out of wishes to protect the interests of the states 
and powerful members of the society, to provide order, justice and stability, to 
represent moral societal values and arguably to provide for many other factors that 
can vary from case to case. 
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How does a norm, in particular an human rights norm, come into existence,  
and how does it develop and become accepted by those who are expected to comply 
with it? The Constructivist models that are used in this study have dealt with this 
question by formulating an evolutionary explanation of the process, starting with the 
emergence of norms and concluding at the point where they become fully 
recognized. It is worthy to note that these models have been mostly centered on 
norms of human rights. One common point in these studies is that very few norms 
become fully internalised and institutionalized, therefore, most case studies seem to 
be located in the middle phases of this process of norm emergence and socialization. 
This is also the case for corporate social responsibility, illustrated through the case 
studies in Chapter 3.    
Before starting to apply these models, it must be noted again that even though 
the state has been taken as a unit of analysis in the studies used to construct the 
following model, there is nothing that inherently restricts the theory to states and 
only to states, as it provides many explanations of the behavior of the TNC’s as well. 
Now we shall take a look at the models drawn by different writers that have used 
constructivist theory to explain behavior and try to combine them in one model that 
can be used in this study (Nadelman, 1990: 470-484, Klotz, 1995: 1-31, Risse and 
Sikkink, 1999: 3-23, Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891-895, Finnemore, 1996: 1-
27). 
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Pre-Emergence Norm Emergence Socialization-Imitation Internalization 
Problem 
activity is 
legitimate and 
not defined as a 
problem yet 
Activity is 
problematised. 
Transational moral 
entrepreneurs become 
involved. Violators 
first choose denial and 
later temporary 
improvement. 
Argumentation starts. 
Discourse starts to 
affect the behavior of 
violators. Interests and 
identities start to 
become redefined. A 
“norm cascade” occurs 
and followers start to 
imitate the actions of 
those who have started 
to comply. 
This stage is not 
usually reached. 
Compliance is 
habitualized. 
Norms are 
institutionalised 
in laws and 
formal monitoring 
mechanisms.   
 
 
Pre-Emergence Period 
1. The problem activity is seen as legitimate. When actors are not involved in the 
activity, this has to do with bilateral treaties and political prudence rather than 
evolving international norms. As the activity begins to be defined as a problem, a 
weak domestic opposition towards those who conduct the act emerges. However it is 
very difficult to gather information about the subject. 
 
Norm Emergence – Persuasion by Norm Entrepreneurs 
2. Emergent norms are embedded in webs of existing norms and new norms emerge 
out of existing social institutions, such as the global security regime arising out of the 
European culture (Klotz, 1995: 22). Moral and emotional attitudes, in addition to 
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material interests are important in the creation of norms as catalysing forces. These 
norms are usually cosmopolitan in nature. Constructivists believe that great powers 
are not necessarily the agents of norm change, since norms and institutions may also 
empower weak states and non-state actors. 
In this stage, activity is defined as a problem and networks of transnational 
moral entrepreneurs (TME’s) start pushing towards the suppression and 
criminalisation of this activity. The role of these networks are very important in 
calling attention to certain issues, alerting public opinion and governments as well, 
differentiating between good and bad practice, mobilizing movements in target 
countries and creating a transnational normative structure that presses the norm 
violators from above and below5.  
For a human rights advocacy network to work effectively there must be a 
permissive structural context. The target actor must also be sensitive to the costs of 
bad reputation and thirdly, local human rights activists must exist and be organized. 
If these criteria are satisfied, these networks are potentially able to exert external 
pressure via media campaigns, mobilizing diplomatic pressure or using United 
Nations (UN) resolutions. Of course, depending too much on these actors for the 
creation of a normative structure can pose many problems. The most important role 
of the actors in the human rights network is acting as the “carriers of the principles 
embodied in international regimes” (Burgerman, 1998: 292). They operate across 
national borders and so have a transnational character. 
When a corporation or government is identified by TMEs as a norm violator, 
its first response is usually denial. The violator tries to refute the validity of the 
norms, saying an illegal intervention in their own affairs has taken place. We will see 
further in this study that this logic works for corporations as well as for governments. 
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According to Risse and Sikkink (1999: 24), the ‘need to deny’ is the first step of 
socialization, since it shows that a threat has been recognised and defined. Public 
attention and awareness start to increase at this stage, as  transnational networks 
begin lobbying and shaming. TMEs do not solely focus on the violators, but also try 
to convince a critical mass of states or norm leaders  to embrace new norms so that 
they can influence the violators as well (Sikkink and Finnemore, 1998: 895). This 
last part mostly applies to the behavior of states; however, we shall see how 
important it is that some corporations begin advocating a norm for the sake of  
getting other companies to imitate the model behavior. 
 
3. This stage characterizes the second part of norm emergence, marked by an 
immediate and mostly temporary improvement. As the transnational networks and 
international society become more involved with the case, domestic groups inside the 
country start to gain power. This is important because international norms become 
influential through the filter of domestic structures and norms, which lead to different 
interpretations and compliance (Sikkink and Finnemore, 1998: 893, Checkel, 1999: 
3). Keck and Sikkink describe this situation as “boomerang effect”, where 
international efforts strengthen domestic efforts, which in turn reinforce the 
international efforts (1998: 14). This is the first stage of socialization, a stage of 
instrumental adaptation. Thus, the creation of a normative structure of human rights 
that will affect the behavior of actors actually starts with material calculations made 
by the violators.  
Transnational corporations do have a powerful influence in reforming 
political conditions; however, it would be naïve to believe that, except in individual 
cases, a firm would take part in an act if it is not in its own immediate material 
                                                                                                                                                                    
5 For further details, see studies of Nadelman, Risse and Sikkink, Sikkink and Finnemore, Klotz. 
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interests. TNCs can be forced to take human rights conditions or environmental 
concerns into account if they are subject to large-scale consumer boycotts. Debora 
Spar calls the factors that lead corporations to be more responsive to human rights 
concerns the “spotlight phenomenon” (Spar, 2000: 9). TNCs that carry their 
reputation and brand names with them when they invest abroad are much more easily 
shamed in the eyes of the NGO’s, interest groups and the international media, 
because they are more famous than some less-known distant state engaging in human 
rights abuses. The advances in communication technologies have led to news on 
these abuses being spread faster and further than ever before. Moreover, when a 
corporation engages human rights abuses or brings harm to the environment, this 
attracts even more attention from the media, since people will pay attention to the 
news about the brand names that they already know.  
Denial, which the firms usually rely on first, usually does not work, although 
in the case studies, the successes of violator corporations that have exhausted the 
denial route will be evaluated. Therefore, the transnational corporation has to make a 
cost-benefit analysis, in which the advantage of engaging in the malpractices must be 
weighed against the cost of negative publicity. The reasons why the TNC is involved 
in political and social developments in the world also mostly involve instrumental 
reasons.6 Actors can be involved in institutional arrangements in the first place for 
identity-affirming reasons as well as material factors. They do not necessarily have to 
believe in the norm at this stage.  
Critiques of the idea of corporate social responsibility tend to look at this 
phenomenon mainly as a matter of public relations benefit for the corporation rather 
than reflecting a sense of genuine concern for the society and environment it operates 
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in as well as for its employees and stakeholders. Environmentalists use the term 
“greenwash” to describe this. It is possible to explain the new debates on 
responsibility as “a reaction to the circumstances in which modern businesses will 
operate rather than evidence that companies have shifted significantly from the goal 
of profit maximization” (Parkinson, 1999: 50).  
However, this idea does not challenge my arguments seriously. The point 
here is that corporations start to bargain with international or domestic opposition. 
An argumentative period begins and a discourse of social responsibility begins to be 
created with the establishment of voluntary codes and standards. When the violators 
start arguing with their critics, there is the danger of being “entrapped in their own 
rhetoric” (Risse and Sikkink: 27, Risse: 2000: 11). Quoting Martha Finnemore here, 
“states are what they do, changes in state function at some level change the nature of 
the state itself” (Finnemore, 1996: 15). When actors start to behave in a certain way 
for some reason, this may affect their identities after all. 
 
Norm Imitation – Start of Socialization by Persuasion 
4. “The intersection of language and practice” is important for Constructivists (Klotz, 
1995: 30), as one methodology used by them is to identify norms through 
communicative processes as well as behavioral outcomes. This method focuses on 
intentionality and acceptability rather than on behavioral compliance and deviance. 
Analyzing discourses as well as behavior is important. The concern for reputation 
must be the main focus at this stage.  
 As seen in the previous paragraphs, reputation matters for the material 
interests of the corporations. But how can reputation lead to an actor being entrapped 
                                                                                                                                                                    
6 When we consider firms that are involved in, for example, the development of oil and gas supplies in 
the Caspian Region following the break of the Soviet Union, they are involved in partnerships with 
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in a certain discourse? When the actor is the state, reputation has an effect on its 
legitimacy and may lead to widespread criticisms that culminate in the state excluded 
from the international community. When the actor is a transnational corporation, 
reputation may directly impinge on profits and must be taken under consideration by 
the corporation.7 Since reputation is defined by the opinions of others, what actors 
can do is to try to establish a certain image which minimizes negative repercussions 
of community criticisms (Klotz, 1995: 30). According to Audie Klotz, “the more 
interactions an actor has with other community members, the more developed its 
reputation will be, while fewer interactions would permit more control of its image. 
(…) An actor’s community relations mostly involve the control of information in 
attempts to fit into the normative frameworks within which other actors evaluate its 
actions.” (1995: 31) Most TNCs have direct contacts with the communities in which 
they operate and have to bear in mind reputation when acting. However, reputation is 
not a variable that immediately leads a company to be more responsible to its 
stakeholders. Some corporations have no direct contacts with the community they 
operate in or with the average customer, which is a problem for increasing corporate 
social responsibility based on the reputation factor alone.    
People over time believe in what they say. This is the motto underlying this 
stage of the process. Actors start to accept the validity and significance of norms 
once they begin to take these norms into regard in their practices. However, until the 
norm is accepted, many problems can be experienced. Even though the moral 
validity of the norm may be agreed on, there may be disputes over which acts are 
within the scope of this norm. Besides, the validity claim of the norm may be 
                                                                                                                                                                    
many governments. This requires being involved in the relationships between states in that area. 
7 Internal reputation also matters for transnational corporations. Employees usually feel more 
comfortable about working with a socially responsible company.  
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challenged altogether (Risse and Sikkink: 13), such as the case of cultural relativism 
debates in the field of human rights.  
At this stage, an important aspect of Constructivism, the re-formation of the 
interests and identities of the actors comes in. As Wendt puts it (Wendt, 1992: 136), 
new common understandings are developed which help to reconstruct the identities 
and interests of the actors through persuasion and complex learning. Complex 
learning can be explained by a simple example. Let us assume that many people 
return books back to the university library scratched, torn and scribbled all over. 
Placing fines on the people who ruin the books can be a way to cope with this, but 
may not prove very effective since there are too many books to be controlled. Many 
libraries and schools choose to teach the norm “the library is the property of 
everyone and harming the books is bad”. Through complex learning, it becomes 
intersubjectively understood that this behavior is contrary to our interests as well, 
since we damage our property as well when we harm the books. Without any 
changes in material conditions, learning can change behavior and preferences of 
actors.  The source of the preference can also come from the outside, not necessarily 
from inside the actor.  
Reformation of identities and interests are possible at the company level. A 
company can tell whether it is doing a good job or not based on what it defines as a 
good job. If the aim of a company is to make profits only, nothing other than low 
profits should bother it. The changes in identities and interests at the company level 
come when this definition changes. CSR prevails when norms regarding human 
rights, social engagement and protection of the environment enter into this definition.  
Fixed preferences, definitions of the situation and collective identities are 
challenged. The identity of a corporation as a solely private actor that undertakes 
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only economic activities to maximise its profits may be reconstructed to include 
social roles and activities not mainly aimed at profit-maximization in its new 
identity. Actually, the transnational corporation has always been successful, due to 
its dynamic structure, in responding to changes, by re-inventing either itself or its 
role in society (Addo, 1999: 6). Although this view will be challenged later in this 
paper, it is one of the main arguments of Constructivists dealing with human rights 
issues, and has explanatory power regarding corporate social responsibility. “The 
more they talk the talk, the more they entangle themselves in a moral discourse they 
can not escape in the long run” (Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 16, Risse, 2000: 11). 
Therefore, at this stage it is more difficult to determine whether compliance with a 
norm results from purely instrumental factors or has the developing discourse of 
human rights has actually had a deeper effect on the behavior of the corporation. We 
will see later that most of the cases of corporate responsibility have reached this 
middle stage at best.   
Another important aspect of this stage is norm imitation. The norm leaders 
previously persuaded by TMEs try to socialise other actors to become norm 
followers. In a competitive world like the one of the TNCs, the acts of others are 
being followed very carefully, which makes the imitation of behavior of the actors 
that choose to comply with norms easier, especially if it yields benefits. “Imitation, 
in a world of uncertainty, is often a perfectly rational strategy to adopt” (Finnemore, 
1996: 11), as policies are changed to solve an already identified problem. This is the 
phase of the “norm cascade” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895), where more actors 
start to adopt new norms rapidly without necessarily responding to an explicit 
material incentive to do so. At the end of this stage, voluntary codes of conduct may 
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emerge as the validity of human rights norms in a specific context becomes more 
widely accepted. For the legal regulations to emerge, further socialization is required. 
However, concerning our case, imitation of behavior does not necessarily 
take place, especially if it does not lead to profits. This is one version of the “free-
rider problem” (Spar, 2000: 11). If a company starts behaving more responsibly, its 
costs may go up, hampering its competitiveness. Companies less sensitive about 
reputation may take advantage of this situation. At this stage, even if imitation does 
not take place, companies that start behaving responsibly have a rational interest in 
diffusing the norms of corporate social responsibility diffusing to other companies 
sharing the same market, so that it can preserve its competitive position and appear 
responsible at the same time.    
The emergence of voluntary codes of conduct is a focus of the corporate 
social responsibility debate. A sign that TNC’s are willingly incorporating or 
internalizing the increasingly influential normative structure of human rights is that 
they are voluntarily choosing to abide by codes of conduct. According to the 
constructivist theory of International Relations applied to international human rights, 
actors indicate more sincere interests in human rights protection when they start 
making this a part of their discourse. Today many TNCs, especially those such as 
Shell International, which have been exposed to large-scale consumer boycotts, 
incorporate articles on the protection of human rights and environment into their 
company programs. Moreover, important international organizations such as United 
Nations, OECD, and International Labor Organization have created non-binding 
bodies of rules for corporations in particular. These codes rest on voluntary 
acceptance rather than legal coercion. However, once the firms have agreed to 
comply, it will be much more difficult for them to escape this responsibility, as 
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suggested by the theory. There are many well-known TNC’s such as Shell, Nike and 
Nestlé, which have followed this process, though it must not be forgotten that 
responsibilities implied in the codes are often vague and therefore, may mean that the 
company will not have to take on much responsibility.   
If we take a look at a few of the most popular codes of conduct created in the 
last decade, the “Global Sullivan Principles” constitutes a framework with which the 
internal practices and policies of socially responsible companies can be aligned 
(Maresca, 2000: 157). Corporations that agree to abide by these principles are 
obligated to monitor their own performance and issue annual reports.8 The UN-
sponsored Global Compact intends to create a framework, which highlights issues of 
human rights, environmental and labor protections derived from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
provides a similar framework9. Important steps have been taken towards protection 
of human rights by transnationals in these codes of conduct, even though many 
people skeptically view the codes as a public relations exercise. Choosing to abide by 
these codes out of instrumental motives should be tested as a plausible rival 
explanation, since becoming a participant brings good publicity to the company. 
However, they are also important since they provide a framework definition of 
“ethical behavior” and the growing literature may help to normatively construct this 
type of a body. These types of definitions will aid TNCs in knowing what exactly is 
expected from them at the global level. It must be noted that they do not carry the 
enforcement power of legal codes and there is no unified set of standards. 
                                                          
8 General Motors, Proctor and Gamble, Shell International and Colgate-Palmolive are among the 
participators in the Global Sullivan Principles. 
9 See http://www.globalcompact.org, http://www.oecd.org for full text. 
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Norm Socialization - Internalization   
5. In this final stage, a global prohibition regime comes into existence and the norm-
violating activity is reduced. Until this stage, domestic and transnational networks 
continue monitoring corporate behavior and applying pressure until norm compliance 
becomes habitual and automatic. Institutionalization is also important in the 
socialization phase. “Institutionalization is a process of internalizing new interests 
and identities” (Wendt, 1992: 137). As a result, identity becomes part of a social 
structure that shapes behavioral outcomes. This view allows that the self-image of 
the transnational corporation as an economic actor aiming solely to pursue profit can 
be altered, if and when this stage is reached, since it is difficult to challenge a norm 
after it reaches this stage of institutionalization.10 This is why it is not common for 
this stage to be reached, even when the actor is the state. We will see in the second 
chapter in the part on legal issues, and also in the case studies, how much more 
difficult institutionalization would be for transnational corporations.  
Without complete socialization and internalization of the norm, the life-cycle 
of the norm remains incomplete. Apart from the shifts in identities, a complete life-
cycle would mean the normative structure being fully developed. This requires 
international organizations that check compliance, a well-developed network that 
monitors violations of the norm, funding, and most importantly - treaties and legal 
background supporting the normative structure and providing mechanisms of 
enforcement. “Once constituted, any social system confronts each of its members as 
an objective social fact that reinforces certain behavior and discourages others” 
(Wendt, 1992: 148). The point is that this social system may fail to come into 
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existence. This final stage helps us to avoid premature celebrations of corporate 
social responsibility as a frictionless phenomenon that will lead all corporations to 
cooperate in the field of human rights and to elevate this responsibility above their 
primary aim of making profits.   
This process defining the life-cycle of norms is not as smooth as it seems, as 
evidenced by many cases failing to progress beyond the second, third or fourth 
stages. Even after these stages are reached, there is always the possibility of a 
reversion to oppression. If leaders of states or corporations do not care about human 
rights pressures, or in the case of corporations, if their direct profits are not affected 
to a serious extent by these pressures, the stage of internalization cannot be reached. 
Companies that are in less direct contact with their customers directly are in this 
position.  
Finally, it is not clear to what extent transnational networks do their job well, 
and moreover how these networks choose the subject to direct their attentions. 
Although they do have important effects on the behavior of TNCs, their successes 
depend on specific cases and their effect seems to diminish as soon as the pressure 
abates. They may find it difficult to keep on monitoring and pressuring once public 
attention on the issue wanes. Moreover, whether a transnational human rights 
network becomes successful or not depends on many factors other than the 
importance of the norm advocated, such as the popularity of the NGO or the degree 
of public interest in that issue at that moment. The cases they select to monitor is 
mostly controlled by the “international” media, which tend to choose cases on their 
marketability. Finally, there is no guarantee that they will always act according to the  
                                                                                                                                                                    
10 Since these norms are no longer the issue of political debate, political scientists usually do not 
analyse them. However, sociologists lately have started to research the most internalised norms to 
problematise and denaturalise them. For further details, see Finnemore and Sikkink, pp. 904 
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most moral of causes, instead of simple motivations of profit and publicity. A better 
and stronger solution would be the creation of international standards of conduct 
through binding agreements with the World Trade Organization. 
The socialization of norms of human rights and social responsibility by the 
transnational corporations does not mean that there will never be conflict between 
profits and ethical conduct. Even when viewed as a PR practice, corporate social 
responsibility is about long-term profit maximization, which may clash with the 
immediate interests of the company. This can be seen as the clash as well as harmony 
between the norms of human equality and markets. 
However, if a doctrine on responsibility is needed to regulate the activities of 
the corporations, and if legal means are not strong enough to provide this regulation, 
it is important to understand how much of an alternative the socialization of the 
norms provides. As much as we expect TNCs to accept their new responsibilities, the 
rules of the market mechanism are very strong and have a longer tradition. This gives 
maybe too great burden to the other actors, who advocate the human rights system. 
Perhaps voluntary codes of conduct and the socialization of norms may provide 
greater guarantees of protection for human rights, etc. in the long run; however, we 
need a more rigid legal framework and effective punishment mechanisms – NGO 
scrutiny is not enough - and a clear definition and acceptance of the concept of 
responsibility. 
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CHAPTER  2 
 
The History and Recent Debates on Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
The study of corporations in relation to human rights is new to the discipline 
of International Relations and there are no clear definitions of corporate social 
responsibility accepted globally. In this chapter, we will focus on the philosophical, 
historical and managerial debates concerning corporate responsibility, in order to 
understand how the concept can be related to International Relations in general and 
the Constructivist theory in particular. The aim is to understand what the norms of 
Corporate Social Responsibility are, how they came to be accepted and what are the 
bases on which these norms rest. 
 
1. Why Should The Corporation Be a Responsible Actor?  
Those who believe in the notion of Corporate Social Responsibility mostly 
agree that transnational corporations deserve to be studied as actors in issues of 
international ethics, since they rival nation states in power and organizational skills 
(Donaldson, 1996: 95). The idea is that their powers should also give corporations 
equivalent non-legal responsibilities. We shall first take a look at the recent 
philosophical debates on this issue to understand on which basis, if any, a 
corporation can be held responsible as an entity. 
 As seen in the previous chapter, the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility 
is about moral norms more than legal norms in present-day politics. According to 
this argument, corporations are considered as moral actors in addition to being legal 
 29 
persons. We will therefore start with a discussion on what being a moral person 
means to understand how is it possible to say that companies have moral 
responsibilities to their societies, as CSR suggests.  
 The conception of morality requires membership in a moral community. For 
centuries, and in the case of the corporation, until the 1970’s, the moral community 
was thought to comprise only individuals. Group and collective responsibility was 
reduced to that of individuals. The ideas of the Church on personal salvation 
deepened this approach. Kant has the individual in mind when speaking of moral 
responsibilities. These ideas, which arguably provide the basis for Western norms, 
rest on the strong individualist tradition. Methodological individualism, stating that 
collective terms should be defined in terms of behavior, psychological states and 
identities of the individual, rests on this tradition of reduction to individual attitudes 
(French, 1984: 2). Corporate Social Responsibility attacks this position by stating 
that human beings in organizations act in a different capacity than when they act 
alone. 
 Since this study aims to apply a theory of international relations that takes the 
state as the relevant actor, we should also differentiate the corporation as a moral 
actor from the state. The concept of the “morality of states” arose after the 1648 
Peace of Westphalia, which is accepted as formalizing the nation-state system. The 
morality of the state is based in the natural law approach (Dower, 1998: 50), which 
states that human beings due to their weaknesses and proneness to wrongdoing 
should live together in organized communities. The morality of states includes 
supporting the system of states, respecting the sovereignty of other states and 
promoting peace and the good of individuals living in a state’s own territory, as put 
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forward in The Anarchical Society (Bull, 1977:15-21). According to Hobbes and 
Locke, the very formation of the state gives it a responsibility towards its citizens.  
 The responsibility of the transnational corporations cannot be based on the 
same grounds as that of the nation state. The “morality of states” draws on a simple 
universal ethical framework, but does not take the TNC or any other institution 
operating across borders into account. The response of many moral thinkers on this 
subject is as follows: “where the lines of cause and effect run across nation states, so 
do the lines of moral responsibility”(Dower, 1998: 165), suggesting a more inclusive 
moral community.                
 The 20th century is especially marked by the growth of large organizations 
and companies that own vast economic assets and have the power to effect direct and 
indirect political and social changes in local communities. However, social impacts 
and wealth are not the sole basis of responsibility. Corporate actions are not easily 
reducible to individual behavior; since it is possible for all individuals to escape 
responsibility in a case where a wrongdoing nonetheless exists.  
 French makes a distinction between types of collectivities based on their 
intentions and organizational structures. An “aggregate collectivity” is merely a 
collection of people, which does not necessarily act intentionally and in a rational 
manner, thus only individuals can be blamed for the turn of events. An angry crowd 
that riots or even a group of grasshoppers that destroys fields can be an example of 
this. Aggregates fail for membership in the moral community on these grounds, 
(French, 1984: 10) and members of these groups can only be held responsible as 
individuals, since the group itself has no anthropomorphic intentions, rationality or 
intelligence.        
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 The collectivity that can be held responsible as a distinct entity is named 
“conglomerate collectivity” by French (1984: 13). It has an identity of its own 
separate from those of the individuals that constitute it, and methodological 
individualism does not hold in these cases. They have internal organizations and 
decision-making procedures, have standards of behavior that apply to their members, 
and their offices do not change when the occupants change. These entities are treated 
as legal persons under the law. According to Goodpaster and Matthews, a 
corporation can have a conscience and should be neither less nor more responsible 
than are ordinary people (1982: 135). It is considered as a unit and has internal 
decision making structures and rules defining authority relationships and specifying 
certain conditions through which certain individual actions become the official 
actions of the group (Donaldson, 1996: 378). Therefore, the moral responsibilities of 
individuals become those of the corporation, through the organizational structure, in 
which features of morality are inherent.    
In most of the cases of CSR that we will analyze later, it is not possible to 
blame individual persons for corporate misconduct. When we say that Nike uses 
cheap labor in East Asia or Shell is causing environmental damage in the North Sea 
or Nigeria, the people associated with this practice can legitimize their actions by 
stating that they were “only doing their job” (French, 1984: 15), even though the 
actual legitimacy of this action may be debatable. The reason for doing this may be 
similar to the Marxist blaming of the system, since the individual in the system is 
only a victim of its wrongdoings, or because it may seem unjust to blame an 
individual for the whole turn of the event. Also, even if all individuals are blamed, 
the intention of the blamer may not yet be identified as the whole scope of the event 
may only be accounted for at a level of higher responsibility (French, 1984: 16). 
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Methodological individualism does not apply in this case, since the conglomerate 
collectivity has its own identity.  
Therefore, for the sake of CSR debates, we do not have to use the concept 
“person” in a literal sense when defining moral persons. Many characteristics of the 
person become embedded in the organizational structure through many processes and 
there is no reason why moral conscience cannot be attributed to the aggregate or 
emergent entity of the corporation.  
The statist view against corporate responsibility is that businesses are not 
elected to represent their communities and there is no reason why they should be 
responsible towards them. The realist position would be that, although a transnational 
corporation may have a corporate identity with its own goals and values, including 
moral values, it does not have to stand in moral relations vis-a-vis other 
transnationals, governments and people (Dower, 1998: 183). Moreover, most 
theories of international relations believe that nation states are the key international 
actors and the “morality of states” should be the essentially accepted global ethic, 
though TNC’s having greater budgets than many poor countries raise important 
questions as to the proper role of nation states in the international arena. However, 
the “moralities of states” approach, as we have seen above, rests on different grounds 
than those of individual and corporate responsibility and does not provide an 
adequate analogue to corporate responsibility. Corporate responsibility is closer to 
the individual responsibility approaches. As new approaches to the global system and 
global governance become more widely accepted, a more inclusive moral community 
must be envisaged, taking the responsibility of the corporation, in addition to 
individual and state responsibility, into account.  
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Economic theorists tend to view systems as the unit of analysis and ethicists 
tend to focus on the individual behavior, neither of which is suitable as a lens for 
analysing the behavior of corporations. Robert Solomon advocates an “individual 
within the corporation approach” to trace the carrier of responsibility. According to 
Solomon, the corporation, not a system or individuals, is the modal unit of commerce 
today. Responsibilities are defined by the roles and duties of the people in 
corporations, in terms of offices and posts (1996: 47). 
French defines the basis of responsibility as power, intentionality, rationality, 
ability to make decisions internally and having reason (1984: 39 - 43). William  
Meyer bases the legitimacy of moral claims and responsibilities on having rights, 
accountability and again, intentionality (1998: 45). Based on these definitions, it is 
clear that the TNCs do have power to bring changes to their communities. The view 
that companies can use this tremendous power only in the economic sphere for the 
sake of the society has also been proven wrong; since it has been seen for many years 
that companies have engaged in non-economic activities that can bring harm or 
benefits to the communities. As the relative power of the TNC vis–a-vis the states, 
especially those of the developing countries, increases, this should result in an 
increase in the responsibilities of the TNCs, as in situations where the states have no 
power to ensure the human rights of their citizens. TNC’s are the more powerful 
actors in these cases, able to influence host-country governments to behave in a 
certain manner and affect human rights conditions directly through their own actions. 
“Companies are not powerless actors. They make choices and those choices directly 
affect the security or insecurity of local populations.” (Pegg, 2000: 12). We shall see 
examples of this in the case studies. In these cases, scrutiny from transnational moral 
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entrepreneurs also increased (TMEs), which  heightens companies’ attentiveness to 
their moral responsibilities.    
Although our definition of corporate responsibility is based mainly on the 
individual, the corporation as an entity possesses individual qualities as well. What is 
important in this case is to recognise that a corporation is greater than the sum of 
individuals employed by it. A TNC has a complex organizational structure and 
learning processes, as described previously. It is helpful to think along these lines in 
order to understand how the role of the corporation can change vis-à-vis society, and 
how a sense of moral responsibility can manifest itself in corporations.  
 
2. Historical Background: 
According to Michael Addo, the most important characteristic of the 
transnational corporation is its ability to re-invent itself and its role in the society 
(Addo, 1996: 6). This view also fits the Constructivist perspective to this subject, that 
the identities and interests of transnational corporations can be redefined through the 
norms of Corporate Social Responsibility. The roles of the TNC, as well as ethical 
understandings of  business conducts have changed throughout history. The goal of 
this section is to analyze the role of business in society and ethical approaches to 
corporations as well.   
Business ethics and corporate responsibility are not novel subjects. 
Corporations as social organizations have been the target of various reform 
movements throughout history. As they expanded in number, size and power, they 
became increasingly visible, especially as they gained global presence and began to 
be called transnational corporations (TNCs). Hundreds of years ago, the East India 
Company deployed over 40 warships, possessed the largest standing army in the 
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world and controlled over 250 million people in an entire subcontinent (Donaldson, 
1996: 96).  
Calls for corporate social responsibility date back to 44 B.C., when Cicero 
wrote on immoral business practices, though approaching the subject from different 
perspectives than those who engage in the corporate social responsibility debates 
today (Pegg, 2000: 2). Aristotle believed that trade for profit lacked virtue and those 
who engaged in this behavior were parasites, while “household trading” that did not 
involve profit-making as the primary motive was desirable and essential to the 
working of societies, an approach that continued until the 17th century (Solomon, 
1996: 49). 
When markets in the modern sense started to emerge in the 16th and 17th 
century, in the form of trade based coffeehouses, parties were expected to act in good 
faith; otherwise they were not admitted to exchange. The importance of owning a 
good reputation – which became crucial for survival in the trade business – began to 
emerge. As the media entered the social sphere, which was dominated by church and 
schools, it became an important arbiter of values, sometimes superseding the 
influence of the former two.    
However until the 19th century, profit making organizations were not 
considered to be corporations; they were rather viewed as artificial, owing their 
existence to government decrees alone. In the 16th century, when two ships collided, 
the responsibility was assigned to the boat owners as individuals, not to the trade 
corporation. Only at the turn of the 20th century were companies seen as the natural 
outcomes of the habits of business people (Donaldson, 1996: 287). After this time, 
establishing a corporation becomes a natural right rather than a privilege. Corporate 
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responsibility also becomes an issue of this era, meaning the corporation itself could 
be condemned or praised for its conduct.   
Even at the beginning of the 20th century, crusading journalists informed the 
public about corrupt business practices (Shalhoub, 1999: 121). Companies were 
criticized for being too powerful, conducting antisocial and anticompetitive practices 
and being interested only in the bottom line (Wulfson, 2001: 135). Anti-trust and 
consumer protection laws came into existence at this time. And even at this time, 
there existed business people aiming to respond to these criticisms, mostly by 
donating to charity. These ideas remained the exception rather than the rule, although 
famous businessmen such as Andrew Carnegie, J.D. Rockefeller and Henry Ford 
devoted large resources to this purpose (Wulfson, 2001: 136). The attitude of these 
businessmen was born out of a perceived need to play charity and stewardship roles, 
which gave them a patronizing duty that diverges from the concept of CSR today 
(Shalhoub, 1999: 131). 
At the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals, the role of businesses in 
supporting repressive regimes was demonstrated (Pegg, 2000: 3). The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 enlarged the concept of international 
law beyond traditional maritime and trade concerns by introducing new areas of 
civil, political, economic and social rights, in the hope of creating an international 
consensus on the basic rights of citizens. The UDHRs relevance for this study lies in 
the preamble, which states that protection of human rights is a duty of all social 
institutions, not just governments. 
Academic debates on Corporate Social Responsibility as a concept began in 
the early 1950’s. The focus was mostly on whether or not businessmen, rather than 
corporations as an entity, had an obligation to society as well as to their stockholders. 
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Business practices were once again brought to public attention in the 1960s with the 
rise of civil rights and consumer movements. At this time, corporations were held 
responsible for a myriad of social problems. The stakeholder theory of capitalism, 
which constitutes one basis for CSR, emerged in this period. After the Lockheed 
bribery scandal in the mid-1970’s, the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was passed 
in 1977 (Pegg, 2000: 3), which led to a great increase in the use of written ethics 
policies by businesses.  
After 1989, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet-bloc 
command economies, norms of capitalism and democracy seemingly became the 
only valid ones in the international arena. Although it would be unduly optimistic to 
accept that it has been transformed into a widespread practice, human rights in the 
context of discourse has become more frequently pronounced in the discourse of the 
last decade. Legal and political barriers to foreign investment began to fall in many 
places of the world. From 1990 to 1997, net long-term flow of private capital from 
developed to developing countries grew from $42 billion to $256 billion, a rise of 
more than 600%, nearly half of it by TNC’s (Imle, 1999: 264). All these factors 
placed businesses in a relatively stronger position than nation states to serve as the 
primary source of jobs, investment and production. With “globalization”, the scope 
of the debates on business ethics expanded to include the areas of environment, 
development studies and human rights.  
The process defined as globalization has affected industrial structures, 
communication networks and markets. The demise of the socialist regimes in many 
countries opened new markets and allowed new possibilities of investment to 
emerge. The transnational corporations gained incredible power in this period as one 
of the most ideologically controlled actors in the “globalized” economy. TNCs have 
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been legitimized and liberated by the dominance of the post-1989 free market 
ideology, and, especially with the help of global networking technologies, have 
increased their powers considerably relative to the national governments. Although 
this era was largely celebrated in the beginning, now it is seen that the end of the 
bipolar system has left the world with many new problems and insecurities. Solutions 
to these problems are now sought after within the system itself, since there is no 
valid present alternative to capitalism. 
Privatization and economic deregulation trends are also important for 
defining the role of companies in the society, with areas previously reserved to 
governments, such as the construction of airports and railroads, being turned over to 
the private sector. This factor blurred the line between governments and 
corporations, with a question of accountability arising and the corporations becoming 
more vulnerable to the effect of public opinion (Schwarz and Gibb, 1999: 6). The 
number of transnational corporations has also greatly increased in the post-Cold War 
period. Therefore, though it is not possible to conclude that TNC’s have replaced the 
state, their power has increased, and they have the capacity to exercise more control 
over national and international policy making (Addo, 1999: 4).  
Globalization of production and capital, which accompanies technological 
innovations, especially in information technologies, has also influenced the ability of 
the public to react to business practices. Even if the concept “worldwide audiences” 
seems exaggerated, it is true that information is now much easier to obtain, which 
makes transnational partnerships of civil society possible. Moreover, critical 
incidents, such as the Bhopal incident in India and the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa 
in Nigeria, which have occured over the last few decades, have all sharpened public 
awareness of the impact of firms on society.   
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The number of NGO’s as well has risen to a great extent after the end of the 
Cold War. Their sphere of influence has increased along with the power that 
communication technologies gives them to monitor corporate performance across 
borders. As acts of corporations became more visible with the help of NGO’s, public 
expectations on environmental, human rights and labor standards of TNC’s have 
been raised.  
As to the role of governments, the public sectors’ role in national economies 
is shrinking everywhere. For years, the main focus of the NGO’s was to change 
government policies, but later they expanded their focus to include 
intergovernmental organizations (Schwartz and Gibb: 133). Only recently have 
businesses become the focus of attention. In 1996, Amnesty International led the first 
campaign on the role of business in China. The most common criticisms of TNC’s by 
these institutions are that they damage the environment, cooperate with ruling 
repressive regimes in exploiting their people, do not treat the employees of the 
workers of the host country fairly and threaten local cultures. However, the link 
between NGOs and TNCs is not fully deliniated yet, and it will take time for both 
sides to adjust to each other. 
What has changed in the area of business ethics is that it is much more of a 
global issue today and has become a concern in fields other than business. As we 
have discussed above, businesses now have great power, an ability to influence many 
political, economic and developmental policies and greater percieved responsibilities 
in the social sphere. Moreover, Corporate Social Responsibility is based on 
responsibility rather than generosity, the business philanthropic approach of the early 
20th century, and rests on the idea that corporations can be held responsible for 
misconduct.       
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3. Legal Arguments: 
The place of law is important when we approach corporate social 
responsibility from a Constructivist point of view. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, norms will be internalized when they become incorporated into laws and 
formal monitoring mechanisms. Most of the Constructivist studies take states as their 
unit of analysis, which, by definition, make laws themselves. When we apply this 
theory to transnational corporations, however, the point is that TNC’s cannot issue 
laws with which they have to abide, although they can publish, and adhere to, their 
own written standards. Therefore, the codes prepared by the TNC’s themselves and 
the standards to which they become a co-signer, despite being important and worth 
analyzing, are voluntary in nature. This is why the role of states and governments, 
which have the power to create and enforce laws, are crucial for internalization of 
norms of CSR. In this section, we shall see what the role of law in ensuring good 
business practice is, both in the home country and in the host country governments, 
in order to understand how much we can rely on law and therefore, what the chances 
are that the norms of CSR are internalized.  
Law does limit the ability of businessmen to maximize profits at the expense 
of others, at least at the domestic level. Some theories of corporate responsibility 
agree that the rule of law is sufficient to ensure good corporate practices. This is the 
“profit maximization within the law” formula, establishing the corporation as a legal 
person (Parkinson, 1999: 147), but not as a moral person. Those advocating this 
formula are grouped as the classical theorists of CSR and they will be analyzed in 
detail in the fourth section of this chapter. In contrast to this view, there are many 
areas in which the law remains insufficient when regulating TNC’s.        
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Today, of the largest 100 economic entities in the world, only half are nation- 
states, while the rest are big companies (Marsden, 2000: 16). Companies have an 
advantage to governments, in terms of being able to act globally. Certainly they are 
powerful than the leaders of poorer nations with weak and/or corrupt governance 
systems, which tend to pursue short-term profit opportunities at the expense of 
addressing longer-term economic and social issues.  
In addition, the laws of poorer host countries generally permit what is 
forbidden in the home countries. Moreover, a multiplicity of state regulations and 
laws lead to confusion and inefficiency and stimulate international efforts at  control 
and uniformity (Parkinson, 1999: 100). There is no specific international law 
available to use in these situations, because there is no regime regulating foreign 
direct investments. TNC’s that operate in these countries are able to act freely, as 
there are no compulsory international regulatory authorities overseeing the whole 
system, or  calculating the social costs of corporate acts. Therefore, one of the most 
significant aspects of contemporary times in relation to corporate social 
responsibility is that international legal mechanisms do not suffice to control 
corporate behavior overseas, especially in underdeveloped countries. Moreover, in 
criminal law cases, corporations are found guilty only through the agency of 
corporate officials. This approach advocates individual responsibility, instead of 
holding the corporation as a whole responsible for misconduct.  
As we saw in the first section about responsibility, the corporation is a legal 
person and can be held legally responsible in many ways. However, the law tends to 
treat the corporation solely as an economic person and consigns the social aspects of 
businesses to a voluntary moral domain (Addo, 1999: 9). In international law, the 
sovereign territorial state is responsible in the area of human rights (Donnelly, 1998: 
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85). Those who sign international human rights treaties are states, which impose 
obligations on themselves only. Therefore, the corporation has no legal status in the 
field of human rights. This is important, since the norms of corporate social 
responsibility are based on norms of human rights.  
The fact that international codes of conduct for corporate entities are 
voluntary, in other words, having “basis in seamless morality rather than firm legal 
grounds” (Addo, 1999: 19), is one of the biggest problems related to the law. Besides 
the fact that there is no compulsion, there are no single set of standards underlying 
the concept of CSR, although there are issues on which there is broad agreement. We 
shall analyze these issues in detail below.  
One other problem with the law is that legal lag relative to the speed and 
efficiency of corporate policy making. There are views suggesting that law can 
respond to the need of the community to regulate corporate behavior, taking norms 
of CSR into account. Michael Addo suggests a broader interpretation of the law than 
exists now, one which takes into account the moral, ethical and social dimensions of 
corporate actions (1999: 21). It is expected that the moral concerns of today will 
transform into the legal obligations of tomorrow.  However, Constructivist theory 
suggests that new norms become institutionalized in laws and formal monitoring 
mechanisms only when compliance is habitualized. At the present, this has not taken 
place.  
 The biggest problem related to law is, as we have seen above, the fact that 
the laws of the home country and those of the host country do not demand a uniform 
set of expectations vis-a-vis corporate behavior. Most TNC’s are established and 
headquartered in developed countries, whereas they choose to invest in less 
developed countries, in order to gain access to cheaper material and labor and less 
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regulation. It is mostly accepted that the laws of the home country, which are often 
more strict in the field of human rights, should prevail.  
Another issue is that it is not clear whether parent companies can be 
responsible for the wrongdoings of their foreign affiliates. However, there have been 
improvements towards defining or clarifying CSR in this issue. In English law, the 
principle that different legal companies have seperate legal identities is well 
established (Pegg, 2000: 15). Companies such as Unocal and Shell could be sued for 
their respective misconduct in Burma and Nigeria in the United States. In the John 
Doe v. Unocal case, which we will examine further in the case studies, it was ruled 
that Unocal could be sued in US courts for human rights abuses committed by 
Burmese authorities acting on its behalf (Pegg, 2000: 16), based on the 1789 Alien 
Tort Claims Act, a law that allows victims of high-seas piracy to sue onshore. This 
case is still pending.  
Home country governments also have the potential to hold their citizens 
responsible. The afore-mentioned Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 makes it 
illegal for US executives to bribe foreign officials. Australia legislated that its own 
citizens would be responsible for sexual abuse of children occuring overseas (Pegg, 
2000: 16). Therefore, it is theoretically possible for the home country to hold its 
firms responsible for human rights abuses overseas. 
In practice though, certain problems exist. First of all, as seen above, the host 
governments are weak aainst TNC’s and benefit from their presence. They may not 
want to pass domestic legislation that provokes the companies to leave the country. 
The fact that no international collective action taken by states is available to compel 
companies to act in a certain way creates further problems.  
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The solution to the problem of potential harm by companies at this time 
seems to be self-regulation, in other words, the internalization of CSR through 
corporate codes by signing international codes of conduct. However, as said above, 
for a full internalization to occur, according to Constructivist theory as applied to 
human rights, the norms of CSR should find place in both national and international 
laws regulating social policies and human rights. Regarding the problems stated 
above, this has the potential to occur, but probably will not take place in the short-
run.              
 
4.  What Is The Scope Of Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
It is still the duty of the nation state to protect the rights of its workers and 
inhabitants. However, there are many cases where the government is repressive, 
overlooks human rights abuses or is simply too weak compared to the rich and 
powerful TNC. Moreover, law does not always provide solutions. However, even 
though the state is established as the only legal person in international human rights 
law to have responsibilities and obligations, people now tend to place responsibility 
on all actors involved, including executives of the company, the governments, 
companies themselves as a body, state officials and international organizations.  
With all these factors in place, companies are facing new challenges of CSR. 
TNC’s operate in a world of speedy communication which exposes them to public 
pressures where foreign investments are often seen as political acts (Imle, 1999: 
263).  Many external forces put pressure on TNC’s, which may account for their 
identity transformation. However, even when a company accepts that it is one of its 
major roles to act responsibly towards society, it is not always easy for it to 
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understand what these responsibilities are. Guidelines and models exist, but they are 
not clear and uniform. There are no definite mathematical measures of CSR, as with 
environmental measures. Moreover, developed countries tend to have a more 
expansive view of these norms than developing countries, where basic rights of 
nutrition, clothing and shelter seem to take higher priority. It is difficult for the 
companies to decide which norms to follow in cases like these. What is clear is that 
companies are regarded as responsible actors in the moral community, and therefore 
require certain standards of conduct in order to know what to do. 
TNC’s operating in different sectors face different CSR problems, which 
makes creating harmonized guidelines for transnational corporations even more 
difficult. However, we are still talking about a world in which certain norms have 
been created through international conventions, agreements, and standards. Many 
international standards of CSR take governmental agreements such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as starting points. The human rights literature in 
general is often offered as a framework for specifying minimum obligations of 
TNC’s. Norms of sustainable development, human rights, democracy, societal 
improvement and corporate citizenship all contribute to CSR (Schwartz and Gibb, 
1999: 76).  
Ethical issues mostly arise from clashes between cultural attitudes in home 
and host countries on issues like environmental standards and wages (Donaldson, 
1996: 96). Cultural Relativism is an important part of CSR debates. Cultural 
Relativism  says that ethical practices differ among cultures and what is right is what 
a particular culture says is right. According to this approach, if a culture approaches 
bribery as morally correct, it is acceptable for a business to participate in this 
behavior. In Italy, for example, US banks choose to minimize their tax payments 
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after seeing that this was an accepted practice and paying taxes meant reduced 
competitiveness. Therefore, it is important to decide whether universalism is 
acceptable, since it is the main theme that CSR rests on. 
Businesses seem to agree that universal norms of conduct should be accepted, 
perhaps to minimize the risk when operating in different countries. Ken Booth points 
out the dangers of the cultural relativism approach, stating that “relativism (...) asks 
one not to intervene, and to leave judgement to those inside, who (ostensibly!) share 
the same values and thought worlds.” (Booth, 1999: 36). The idea to base CSR on 
existing international human rights standards has been endorsed by Amnesty 
International and many NGO’s; international organizations like OECD and 
International Labor Organization also recommend this approach.      
To understand what we should expect from the concept of CSR, we should 
first take a look at the theories dealing with it. According to classical theory, which 
has put forward the “profit maximization within the law” formula, legal scrutiny is 
enough to ensure misconduct does not take place; apart from this, economic 
responsibilities of the corporations prevail. The responsibility of executives is mainly 
to promote efficiency and effective economic performance for their shareholders.  
The well-known follower of this approach is the Chicago School economist Milton 
Friedman, who stated that corporations should not care about societal interests since 
market forces will see that the society benefits (Shalhoub, 1999: 18). According to 
Friedman, “the only responsibility of business leaders is to generate and maximize 
profits within the prevaling legal framework” (Friedman, 1982: 133). The followers 
of classical theory would suggest that with the fall of state socialism, the norms of 
the market remain the only choice.  
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A second approach, which is probably the most widely accepted one by 
businesses, governments and international organizations worldwide, is the 
stakeholder theory which emerged in the 1960’s (Parkinson, 1999: 140). In politics, 
this theory aims to show how individuals working together can affect forces that 
shape the society, and how the economy can be organised to benefit businesses, 
individuals and the society in large (Darling, 1997: 10). This theory states that 
business executives should be responsible to stockholders and everyone who is 
directly affected by the actions of the firm, such as employees, consumers, 
community groups, suppliers and governments, extending beyond the owners and  
stockholders of the company11. A rebuttal to the classical theory is that, ideas of 
justice, fairness and security did not wither away with the end of the Cold War, they 
have only taken new forms, and corporations should adapt themselves accordingly. 
The social demandingness theory states that corporations should protect and 
promote interests of general public, including non-stakeholders, in areas such as 
safety, health and freedom. An even more radical approach, the social activist theory, 
believes that, in addition to these, TNC’s should also advance the interests of general 
public. However, these ideas are not widely represented and the stakeholder theory 
seems to represent the basis on which CSR rests.   
In general, the predominant description of CSR seems to be that TNC’s have 
social and ethical responsibilities in addition to legal and economic obligations, 
though the scope of these responsibilities seems unclear. Most TNC’s, as well as 
NGO’s and international organizations, seem to endorse the notion of responsibility 
to stakeholders and fashion their codes according to this theory.  
                                                          
11 Despite many similarities existing, this theory is not the exact equivalent of CSR doctrines today, 
since the Stakeholder Theory hosts any concepts such as Corporate Governance, Business Ethics, 
Local Governments. 
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Many global civil society approaches have touched on corporate social 
responsibility as well. The main preposition is that the foundation that TNC’s use to 
pursue their economic goals is the entire infrastructure of civil society (Schwartz and 
Gibb, 1999: 97). The benefits that businesses gain from operating under the written 
and unwritten rules of this infrastructure also gives them equivalent responsibilities 
and the TNC, therefore, cannot be percieved solely as an economic entity. They have 
their position embedded in Western cultural values, since they are in the process of 
determining cultural values.  
Although the concept of CSR contains many definitions, the status of profits 
in these definitions has remained fairly constant. Profits constitute the main 
economic mission of the businesses, and corporate social responsibility never negates 
earning profits. This understanding foreshadows what we can expect from a change 
of identity, since the profit-making dimension of the businesses will not vary. The 
doctrine is mostly about balancing the benefits gained against the cost of acheiving 
these benefits (Wulfson, 2001: 136). The “triple bottom line” focus summarizes the 
new approach of businesses, stating that they should be accountable for 
environmental as well as their financial performances and records (Pegg, 2000: 5).   
It is clear that both the legal and moral responsibilities of TNC’s have 
increased as expectations of them rose in the 1990’s. There are many laws and 
regulations about firms that create pressures for standardization since there are 
differences among state laws on TNC’s12. The goal of institutionalization of ethical 
and social principles is to ensure that organizational CSR concerns are treated in the 
same manner as legal, finance and marketing ones (Schwartz and Gibb, 1999: 5). 
                                                          
12 Regulatory efforts to build uniformity can be divided into 4: inter-firm standards which are the 
initiatives of industries and consumers, inter-governmental standards which are based on specific 
purpose agreements between nation states, cooperative efforts between governments and industries 
and the efforts of international organizations such as ILO and the OECD Standards on businesses. 
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Although it is not possible to say that these norms have been truly institutionalized, 
nearly every well-known TNC has included corporate social responsibility as part of 
its main corporate goal,  almost achieving a total consensus on the meaning of the 
concept.  
Which behaviors are included in the context of CSR? To find out what 
different actors understand from the context, we shall take a look at the corporate 
conduct of well known transnational corporations13 as well as the codes written by 
different international organizations, business partnerships and non-governmental 
organizations. Firms from different industries are surveyed in order to find general 
patterns of conduct, and keywords from their corporate guidelines are included. All 
firms, though randomly selected, include themes of corporate social responsibility on 
their websites.  
Ford Motor Company, a member of the automotive industry, in its 2000 
Corporate Citizenship Report, stresses employee and labor rights, environment, 
transparency, governance and climate change.  
Levi Strauss includes charitable and philanthropic activities, diversity with 
respect to minority rights and indigenous people, community involvement projects 
such as educational and combat-AIDS programs, employee relations, environment, 
civic engagements, grant making and social justice. This firm is widely celebrated 
for its business practices.  
Nestlé, which we will analyze further in the case studies is a company which 
has suffered from bad publicity, especially in the 1980’s. The main reason for these 
criticisms was harmful marketing campaigns. Nestle has published its Corporate 
Business Principles, which cover its approach to social responsibilities. It mentions 
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environment, scientific research, respect for the social, political and cultural 
traditions of all countries it operates in, sustainable development, combatting child 
labor, ethical advertising, diversity, employee rights and non-involvement in 
corruption in the host countries. 
Unilever, again one of the most respected firms, is a forerunner of CSR. The 
summary keywords describing this company’s views on CSR are environment, 
employee rights, community projects relating to education and health, and support 
for arts, culture and sports.  
Siemens includes corporate citizenship, respect for cultural values, grants, 
sponsorship to arts, values of democracy and health care in its social responsibilities. 
Through its Caring Hands Program, Siemens has been involved in building houses, 
organizing a breast cancer walk in Florida and charity projects.  
McDonalds, which is one of the most-criticised companies worldwide, places 
corporate responsibility on the front page of its website. McDonalds considers 
animal welfare, support for education, environment, safety and quality product, 
employee rights and diversity among its prior issues of social responsibility. 
McDonalds also supports the Ronald McDonald House Charities program.  
Adapting to one specific model may not be enough for TNC’s, since new 
norms frequently emerge and the old models become outmoded. Instead, they tend to 
take a dynamic approach that allows them to adapt to new conditions and thoughts – 
this is a process which allows the TNCs to reconsider their roles in society 
constantly.  
In addition to the codes internalized by major TNC’s, standards are put 
forward by international organizations, NGO’s and business partnerships, aiming to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
13 For further details, check the corporate website at http://www.ford.com, 
http://www.levistrauss.com, http://www.nestle.com, http://www.unilever.com, 
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achieve uniformity in the international arena based on internationally accepted 
standards of human rights. Theoretically, this means that there is a call for change 
coming both from inside and outside of the corporation. We shall focus on the 
standards of OECD, United Nations and International Labor Organization, and also 
take a look at the codes of the Apparel Industry Business Partnership and Social 
Accountability 8000 in this regard. 
The OECD Guidelines for Multiational Enterprises are “voluntary principles 
and standards for responsible business conduct”.14 It advocates transparency and 
accountability in doing business. The main concepts this code focuses on are human 
rights, labor standards, environmental protection and combatting corruption. This is a 
governmental agreement, where governments disseminate codes to the corporations 
operating under their legal system, which the latter are supposed to apply and 
implement. However, there are no legal sanctions for violators. 
The UN Global Compact was issued in 1999, focusing on labor rights, human 
rights and environmental protection. Corporations sign and implement this 
document, but it is possible to partner with third parties for monitoring and reporting. 
Governments have no formal role in this process. Many large-scale international 
NGO’s such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International support this 
process.  
The ILO Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, which 
focuses on labor rights, employment and training, were issued in 1977. Although 
these guidelines are based on ILO Covenants which are widely accepted as 
international legal documents, they are mere recommendations. Governments sign 
and promote them and also have a role in encouraging their adoption.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.siemens.de, http://www.mcdonalds.com.   
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Social Accountability 8000 are standards developed by two business 
partnerships, Social Accountability International and the Council on Economic 
Priorities, with an aim to provide uniformity in the world. These standards claim to 
certify compliance through independent and accredited auditors, stressing child 
labor, labor rights, health and safety in the workplace, compensation, working hours 
and discrimination. The Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP) establishes a program of 
voluntary, industry self-regulation. A manufacturer or retailer chooses to be reviewed 
by AIP’s Fair Labor Association, and is “certified” if it meets the minimal 
requirements. The concepts that these standards mention are child labor, workplace 
safety and minimum wage.  
We have taken a short look at the standards adopted by major transnational 
corporations, international organizations, NGO’s and business partnerships. 
Although there are differences in the items creating the standards, we can see that a 
general consensus has been reached on what the social and environmental 
responsibilities of the corporation are. These create a definition of CSR which 
includes adherence to universal human rights, environmental protection, 
transparency, combatting child labor and corruption, non-discrimination, workplace 
safety and civic engagement projects.  
In addition to these codes, there are social investor services, such as the 
Domini Equity Fund, which is a newly developing institution that has the power to 
inforce the norms of CSR. It provides screening for individual and institutional 
investors that want to direct their resources to companies with good records and 
social reputation. The Domini Fund has outperformed the Standards and Poors’ 500 
                                                                                                                                                                    
14 For further details, see http://www.oecd.org/EN/home/0,,EN-home-93-nodirectorate-no-no-no-
28,00.html.  
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Index (Pegg, 2000: 7)15.  Council on Economic Priorities is another fund which gives 
awards each year. Although these funds are seen as new ways of constructing and 
reinforcing corporate norms, there are widespread criticisms of these funds, 
especially of their methods of monitoring. When we consider that Chevron was given 
the Best Company Award by the Council of Economic Priorities while committing 
large scale human rights abuses in Myanmar, this criticism seems justifiable. They 
also state that screening is only a tactic and does not change the way we percieve 
corporations, although it is worthy to emphasize this initiative has proven somewhat 
successful. 
It has been seen that companies that explicitly include ethical commitments in 
their annual reports have outperformed other companies financially. These statistics 
show that CSR seems to be profitable at present. This does not show that TNC’s act 
for the sake of norms of CSR per se. According to the Constructivist approach, a 
complete institutionalisation of the norms will be required for them to carry 
independent weight from profit concerns, which will include companies sometimes 
“mak[ing] less than the maximum possible profits” (Parkinson, 1999: 62). It is not 
clear in the contemporary world how much managers would adhere to “CSR despite 
profits” although it seems perfectly acceptable for them to follow norms of CSR 
when these coincide with profitability. The second alternative does not signify an 
important change in identity and interests of TNC’s, and only when CSR norms are 
viewed as independent goals of TNC’s and equal in standing to profits, it can be said 
that they are truly institutionalised. The contemporary situation points to a mere 
structural adaptation and it is not clear whether norms will improve corporate 
                                                          
15 According to Pegg, the average annual total return for the Domini Social Equity Fund in 1999 was 
22.63% for one year, 29.58% for five years and 19.79% since inception whereas the figures of the 
Standards and Poors Index were respectively, 21.04%, 28.58% and 19.43%. These figures are also 
available at the Domini website, http://www.domini.com    
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behavior following their emergence and legal institutionalisation on an international 
scale.    
Corporations are subject to change resulting from pressures coming from 
both outside and also from inside the company. Firms that have not engaged in 
socially unacceptable behavior still choose to adopt corporate codes of conduct, 
perhaps to minimise the risk of bad publicity before a problem erupts. When 
analyzing change in the TNC’s, the social and economic dimensions of the corporate 
entity should not be separated from each other (Addo, 1999: 9). The corporation 
cannot not be expected to change into an actor that puts profits at the end of its list of 
priorities. The end goal is still justified in economic terms and the TNC is still 
defined in terms of profits. Moreover, all the new roles of the TNC can be justified 
with reference to the economic field.   
Most initiatives of CSR result from operational interests and from the moral 
initiatives of executives, not from codes, agreements or legislations. These show that 
CSR norms are far from being institutionalised, rather than personalized, though 
there are things to be expected.  
Moreover, the issue of  transnational moral entrepreneurs (TMEs) is worth 
discussing. Our scheme attaches too great a role and too much importance to TME’s, 
international organizations and the media. However, there is no evidence that the 
cases publicized by these actors are the most deserving of all; mostly an NGO 
chooses to boycott a firm out of chance or because it suits the interests of the 
organization. The whole effort to make things “better” becomes a marketing 
campaign in the process we have described, and only those with the means, or those 
who stick to the rules of “global civil society” attract attention, such as the Tibetans, 
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Zapatistas or the Ogoni (Bob, 2002: 37). In other words, the movement gains 
recognition when it successfully transforms itself into a brand name. 
In this regard, global civil society should not be viewed as an arena where all 
voices are heard and the most deserving get attention. Knowing this does not matter 
much when trying to explain only the behavior of corporations, but when we want to 
make predictions about CSR and the limits of its social influence, this factor should 
be calculated as well. The process of CSR is not something that promotes “good” 
ethical causes, nor can it claim to be all-inclusive. However, it is important to 
understand the dynamics of the process to be able to cope with exclusion or inherent 
injustice.  
As a result, it is possible to say that Corporate Social Responsibility has 
emerged from being a pure business ethics issue to entering the spheres of 
philosophy, history, politics and international relations. The literature seems to be 
evolving so as to accept corporate responsibility as a whole in addition to individual 
responsibilities of corporate officials in criminal cases. Moreover, especially after the 
Cold War, the force of moral expectations of NGO’s, international organizations and 
people at large have exceeded that of the legal codes regulating the behavior of 
corporations, especially those that operate abroad. Therefore, the corporation is 
slowly being established as an actor in the moral community, although the law lags 
far behind in codifying the norms of CSR. Therefore, based on the theoretical 
background drawing on the works of Nadelman, Risse, and others, we can say that 
the norms have not been truly internalized or socialized and are only in the beginning 
phase of beginning of the socialization. At this point, discourse starts to affect 
violators, imitation begins to take place and the interests and identities start to 
become redefined. After taking a look at how certain transnational corporations have 
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responded to challenges from the emerging norms, we will be able to understand 
better whether CSR norms will find a place in the national and international laws and 
directly determine the behavior of the corporation through their redefined interests, 
or vanish as a trend of the late 1990’s and the early 2000’s.  
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CHAPTER  3 
 
Case Studies 
 
 Throughout this chapter, by using the Constructivist model explained in 
Chapter 1, the responses of certain companies to the pressure on them to apply norms 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) will be analyzed. By using case studies, it 
can be seen that certain patterns have repeated themselves in the presence of certain 
events and problems that have emerged. The aim of using cases is to fully understand 
what can be expected from the emerging concept of CSR, and how much these 
norms have truly been institutionalized and internalized by the corporate actors. We 
will also try to find out whether any changes in the identities and conceptualizations 
of interests have occured. Certain legal issues that have arisen will also be analyzed 
to understand what we can expect from the law in the future, and what the legal 
developments today are in terms of incorporating norms of CSR. 
 In terms of the process of norms emergence, socialization and 
institutionalization described in Chapter 1, we will also be able to understand which 
phases the actors in our process have reached and what we can expect from CSR at 
the present and in the future.   
 
1. Nestlé - Harmful Advertisement Campaigns: 
According to the World Health Organization and UNICEF, approximately 
1.5 million babies die every year because they are not breastfed16. Many babies, 
especially in developing countries, also suffer from malnutritition and diseases. 
                                                          
16 http://www.babymilkaction.org  
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However, the percentage of breastfeeding around the world continues to drop, which 
is somewhat attributed to the direct marketing campaigns of companies producing 
breastmilk substitutes.  
Nestlé’s campaigns to market breast milk of substitutes in developing 
countries caused an uproar in the late 1970’s and led to a boycott that continues 
today. The main idea of the campaign against Nestlé was that breastfeeding was the 
healthiest way of feeding for the baby and it should not be discouraged among poor 
women. Moreover, since substitudes of breastmilk were mostly prepared by adding 
water, and water was often contaminated in the countries in which this food was 
marketed, they created great health risks for the babies, including diarrhoea, 
malnutrition and even death. The other issues of the campaign were that the products 
of Nestlé were expensive for the budgets of the families of the developing world and 
therefore led to babies being underfed, since once breastfeeding has stopped, it 
cannot be started again. All these problems together contributed to “Bottle-Baby 
disease”17.  
As information about the disease became public, the period of norm 
emergence began. We can define the period until 1977, the year when a large-scale 
boycott began against Nestlé, as the pre-emergence period. Throughout the 1970’s, 
as information about the hazardous effects of infant formula in the Third World 
became widely known, opposition to the manufacturers of these products started to 
emerge. The marketing campaigns for these products were defined as a problem 
activity to be shamed.   
Companies, including Nestlé, were and are aware of the “Bottle Baby 
disease”. Concerns about this phenomenon in the Third World, combined with the 
aggressive promotional activities of the companies, led to large-scale boycotts led by 
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NGO’s such as Baby Milk Action. The Nestlé boycott began in 1977, when it was 
discovered that infants were dying in developing nations and Nestlé encouraged 
bottle feeding by giving away free samples of these substitutes to hospitals, therefore 
encouraging the use of these products in the developing countries. The company was 
also under scrutiny for misinforming mothers and health workers in its promotional 
activities. Instructions and warnings were absent, not appropriately displayed or  
written in a foreign language on the packages. 
Despite reports on such problems, Nestlé and other infant formula 
manufacturers continued to promote infant formula. When first informed about the 
effects of its products, the company denied responsibility and refused to change its 
practices. As stated in Chapter 1, denial can be accepted as a first step towards 
socialization, since it means that a threat has been recognised by the company and 
has been defined (Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 24).  
When it was understood that the company could not be pursuaded to change 
policies, a boycott led primarily by religious groups was launched in 1979. These 
groups were later supported by International Nestlé Boycott Committee and 
International Baby Food Action Network. This first Nestlé boycott was perhaps the 
first activist campaign of its type. It attracted cross-border participants in attempting 
to reform a practice lying outside the state-centric interests of international politics. 
Moreover, it was probably the largest scale transnational social movement against a 
transnational corporation. This is an example of transnational moral entrepreneurs 
pushing towards the suppression of the problem activity (Nadelman, 1990: 24). The 
boycott was well organized and was able to go on for 7 years.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
17 http://www.mcspotlight.org/beyond/nestle.html  
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The campaigns resulted in the adoption of the voluntary WHO/ UNICEF 
International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitudes in 198118. Since these 
two international organizations supported the campaign, a permissive structural 
context for norm emergence was also valid at the international level. As the boycotts 
grew and started to harm Nestlé’s corporate image, the company agreed to abide by 
the code. By doing this, it had accepted the problem of “Bottle Baby Disease” in 
developing countries, and also that it was responsible for helping prevent it. The 
company changed its policies of promotion, stopped general advertising and 
distributing free samples to the public and agreed to put a warning containing the 
words, “Breast milk is best for babies. Before you decide to use an infant formula, 
consult your doctor and clinic for advice” on the packages on the bottles19. Over the 
years, companies such as Abbott Ross, Bristol Myers and American Home Products, 
which marketed the similar products agreed to abide by the WHO codes as well. 
Therefore, the goals of the boycotters were achieved with relatively satisfactory 
results. The boycott ceased in 1984.    
 The boycott was called off because it was percieved that the process of the 
socialization of the norms had began (Sikkink and Finnemore, 1998: 893). Nestlé 
had made some instrumental adaptations based on material calculations, since the 
corporate image had been harmed as a result of the boycotts. This is the spotlight 
phenomenon, explained by Spar (Spar, 2000: 9). However, since the company had 
also accepted the WHO codes and made changes in this regard, it had already 
undergone a certain redefinition of its identity as a responsible corporate citizen. 
(Klotz, 1995: 30-31) The interests had been redefined, appearing to be a responsible 
                                                          
18 At the World Health Assembly in 1981, 118 countries voted for the code to become the new 
voluntary guidelines of practice adopted as a minimum requirement for all countries. For further 
details about the campaigns and the codes adopted, see 
http://www.mcspotlight.org/beyond/nestle.html, http://www.gentleparenting.com.  
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actor seemed a better strategy than denial of its responsibilities after a certain stage. 
However, these redefinitions did not necessarily mean that the company no longer 
visualized itself as a profit-making entity, and the material reasons for taking on an 
additional role were much stronger. Nevertheless, other actors operating in the same 
sector were also imitating the behavior of Nestlé. This indicated another stage of 
socialization.  
 In 1988, when it became widely known that Nestlé had been violating the 
NGO code, the boycott resumed, with the participation of the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) this time. General advertising and providing free samples to 
hospitals had been documented (Schwartz and Gibb, 1999: 43). Nestlé immediately 
chose denial again, saying it had not committed as many violations as it was accused 
of committing and always corrected them when they become known. An important 
claim of Nestlé was that malnourished mothers and the mothers of twins and 
premature babies were unable to breastfeed, despite the findings of health 
organizations claiming that there was no evidence to support this.  Moreover, Nestlé 
stated that it had adhered to the WHO Code, and as the party that had the 
responsibility to audit abuses, WHO had not raised any accusations against the 
company.  
 One important point is that, since Nestlé had agreed to abide by the WHO 
Code, it had presented itself to the public as a responsible citizen, acting in 
accordance with the Code in the Third World.  The company chose denial when 
shamed after this period; however, it could not suggest that the responsibilities of 
abiding by the Code were unnecessary. Nestlé had established direct contacts with 
the community and its reputation depended on adhereing to the Code. The moral 
                                                                                                                                                                    
19 See http://www.nestle.com  
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validity of the norm was accepted by the company; however, which acts were 
included in the scope of the norm was now being disputed.   
Still based on the same claims that breast-feeding is the only healthy method 
of nutrition for babies, especially in the Third World, the boycott is still active in 
over 80 countries. According to Baby Milk Action, an NGO devoted to these causes, 
“Nestlé (…) increases profits by promoting artificial infant feeding in the violation of 
the WHO [International Code]. (…) Because of Nestlé’s continued disrespect for the 
International Code and infant health, the company remains to be subject to a 
consumer boycott of its production in 18 countries. The boycott will continue until 
Nestlé abides by the International Code (…) in policy and practice.”20 Despite all 
these efforts, Nestlé still dominates about 50% of the world breast milk substitute 
market.  
This time, Nestlé has many supporters as well, which makes the claims of the 
boycotts debatable. New issues concern whether mothers with AIDS, especially in 
Africa, transfer the disease to their children by breastfeeding and therefore would be 
better served by using infant formulas. However, the corporate image has not 
recovered yet, and there are many people around the world that do not buy the 
company products.   
While boycotts in cases like these mostly intend to damage financial 
performance and harm corporate image, they are more successful in the second aim. 
This is why most companies see CSR as an issue about long term performance about 
the company, since harms brought to the image of the company will affect long term 
profits. It is hard for TNC’s to respond to boycotts seriously. The particular success 
                                                          
20 The 18 countries that take part in the boycott include Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Mauritus, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,  
United Kingdom and United States. Further details and the full script of the text can be found at the 
website http://www.gentleparenting.com.    
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of the first Nestlé boycott was related to the fact that specific organizations were 
willing to campaign in a focused manner and the campaign, aided by United Nations 
remained well-funded for over 10 years.  
However, debates still continue about the second boycott and such a focused 
global audience does not exist anymore. It cannot be seriously claimed that there 
have been absolutely no changes in Nestlé’s policies and practices over the years; 
however, it is debatable whether the norms of CSR relating to this issue have been 
internalised. It is true that some policies and practices have changed and became 
customary. However, a true intersection of language and practice has not transpired, 
which happens when communicative processes lead to the socialization of the norm 
together with behavior compliance (Klotz, 1995: 30). A discourse of CSR has been 
created but how much the behavior was motivated by this discourse remians unclear.  
The fact that Nestlé immediately hired PR experts after the outbreak of the 
second crisis shows that the company wished to reconstruct its damaged image while 
avoiding real changes in corporate practices21. This is the viewpoint of the protestors. 
However, it can also be stated that Nestlé found the changes it made to be 
insufficient and had no problems with its role in the world and now defined itself as a 
socially responsible company. Regardless of the claim to this effect, it can not be 
said that the norms have been truly internalised by Nestlé, since profits continue to 
dominate the agenda of Nestlé and the issue is seen as one of marketing. 
 No legal action was taken in the case of Nestlé, which shows that the methods 
of enforcement have normative power only. Norms have not been institutionalised 
within a legal structure, which makes compliance hard to enforce. This is the 
situation for most norms of CSR. Moreover, when a norm of social responsibility is 
 64 
accepted by the violators, there is often confusion as to what the content of the norm 
is. This was probably the original cause of the second crisis, when it seems like the 
company and the moral entrepreneurs could not agree on the definition of the norm 
and scope of the WHO Codes. While NGO’s were accusing the corporation of 
violating the norms, Nestlé seemed to believe that it was adhering to its promises. 
Therefore, a social system that reinforces certain well-defined behavior and 
discourages other forms of behavior has not come into existence. Another fact is that 
the self-image of the company as a primarily profit-seeking actor has not been 
transformed, which can be understood from the immediate response of Nestlé to the 
second crisis. The life-cycle of the norm has not been completed, although some 
positive developments in terms of acceptance of a certain norm of CSR have 
occurred.  
 
2.  Unocal – The Case of Disinvestment 
 
Disinvestment is another highly controversial norm of CSR. Disinvestment 
debates concern whether engagement or isolation is the best way to deal with 
repressive governments in countries with valuable natural resources, and where 
corruption pervades the society. For years, Unocal’s operations in Myanmar 
(formerly Burma) has been at the center of such a debate.  
There is no easy answer to disinvestment in cases like these, since it is hard to 
decide whether the company remaining in the country will cause more harm than if it 
leaves. However, companies investing in countries with “bad” regimes are much 
more heavily scrutinized than others and are more likely to be blamed for what the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
21 This is not very difficult to do for the company, considered that the budget of Nestlé advertising 
campaigns are biger than the WHO ordinary budget. For further details, see 
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regime itself does. This makes staying in such a country a risky investment. Unocal 
chose to remain in Myanmar despite the withdrawals of many well-known TNCs 
including Apple, Motorola and Pepsi. 
In Myanmar, a repressive and brutal military junta ran the government after a 
coup d’etat. The oil company was there before the coup and chose to remain 
afterwards, despite public criticisms. Myanmar was still considered as an acceptable 
area of investment by the company. The main justification for this decision was that 
the involvement of Unocal, being politically neutral, being involved in an energy 
infrastructure project that would benefit the people at the end, and creating benefits 
for Burmese employees and the immediate community, had a net positive impact on 
the country.  
The authoritarian military regime, known as State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC), has committed gross human rights violations, including repression 
and torture, especially of political dissidents and ethnic minorities. Amnesty 
International has reported that forced labor is common, especially in areas with 
concentrations of ethnic minorities22.  Extrajudicial executions, forcible relocation 
and use of child labor were other crimes committed by the regime.  
 Together with French based Elfina/ Total, the US-based Unocal was involved 
in the Yadana natural gas project, which was to be a massive natural gas pipeline 
from Burma to Thailand that running through the ecologically sensitive Tenasserim 
region inhabited by the ethnic Karen people. The project was supported by the 
government. The Tenasserim region is one of the largest standing rainforests left in 
Southeast Asia. As information about the regime and also the role of the company in 
                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.transnationale.org.  
22 See http://www.earthday.org/goals/burma.htm  
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the country became publicized, staying in the country and cooperating with the 
regime was defined as a problem activity.  
Unocal drew intense criticism from human rights and humanitarian 
organizations for even remaining as the use of forced labor and conscription in public 
projects were documented. The Yadana project was one of these projects. The 
country was one of a very few which did not allow NGOs inside for monitoring, so it 
was not possible to get a clear picture of what was happening inside. Unocal was 
accused of relying on the army to remove indigenous people from pipeline paths and 
coercing them into supporting the pipeline. Amnesty International and Sierra Club, 
being able to document the impact of the project on the environment, human rights 
and the militarization of the zone, were the leading organizations that were involved 
in shaming the government and the companies. Since 1992, when the project got 
underway, many NGOs have reported that abuses by pipeline security forces had 
increased. Environmental damage was another criticism, since the influx of soldiers 
in the Tenasserim region led to an increase in illegal hunting, logging and wildlife 
trade.    
Just after the first criticisms were directed against Unocal, the TNC entered 
the denial phase. Releasing a report in March 1997, it claimed that it provided higher 
wages 30% percent higher than the national average and that the national security 
forces were used to protect the workers. Unocal also added that the human rights 
abuses and the pipeline project were not related. The main proposition of Unocal was 
that “global energy companies can be powerful instruments of change and 
modernization, directly and indirectly (…) improve the lives of people, encourage 
the spread of democratic values” (Imle: 264).  
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Unocal is a company which does not operate face-to-face with its customers 
and is not very vulnerable to pressure from its shareholders or employees. In this 
case, a bad corporate image does not translate into a loss of profits. Thus, Unocal did 
not feel obliged to withdraw from the country. In our case, the factors needed for the 
process of norm internalization to continue were not satisfied, and socialization of 
norms was not feasible for this company. The target actor relatively insensitive to the 
costs of bad reputation and did not even make structural changes to avoid negative 
publicity, such as deepening contacts with the people of the region, making 
donations to schools or hospitals or agreeing to adhere to a global code. As in the 
case of Nestlé, international organizations did not help to foster a large scale boycott 
either. The company did not even enter the structural adaptation phase (Sikkink and 
Finnemore, 1998: 893). SPDC, however, has banned forced labor, although 
environmental destruction and human rights abuses may still be going on. 
 However, on the legal side, a lawsuit John Doe v. Unocal was filed against 
Unocal by farmers in the pipeline region with the NGO Earth Rights International 
acting as co-counsel. The company was blamed for damages in connection with 
human rights abuses committed by the Burmese army. In 1997, a US federal district 
court in Los Angeles agreed to hear the case, concluding that corporations and their 
executive officers could be held legally responsible under the Alien Tort Claims Act 
for violations of international human rights norms in foreign countries and that US 
courts could adjudicate such claims. Despite agreeing that Unocal was engaged in 
malfeasance23, the court finally  dismissed the case, concluding that Unocal could not 
be held responsible unless the company had directly asked the military to commit the 
                                                          
23 The plaintiff had argued that Unocal knew about the human rights abuses committed by the military 
before joining the pipeline project, and the company had hired Burmese military for security. The 
military, according to the plaintiff, had also used forced labor for this project and committed many 
crimes of violence.  
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abuses. Although yielding no solution, such cases have been increasingly heard in 
courts. For internalization to take place, the normative structure must be supported 
by a legal background (Wendt, 1992: 148), and the fact that the case is heard at the 
court shows that CSR is starting to be woven into legal structures. 
It is widely accepted that even if the company does not engage in abusive 
behavior, it appears extremely risky to invest in a “bad” country, in the eyes of public 
opinion and transnational moral entrepreneurs, unless the company can openly 
challenge government policies, as Shell did in South Africa. Many companies decide 
in rare cases like these that it is not worth the risk and decide to withdraw from the 
country instead. A company in this case cannot evade the issue by saying its duty is 
only in profit-making, and in almost every similar case, the justification for 
remaining in the country has been that investment would be better for the community 
than not investing. 
Although Unocal has not pulled out of Myanmar, and not much change has 
come about as a result of protests, the fact that Unocal is shamed still matters for the 
company. After all, even engaging in denial meant that a certain threat had been 
acknowledged by the company (Risse and Sikkink, 1998: 29). A whole website has 
been designed to indicate this acknowledgement, informing the public about its 
actions and justifying its presence in Myanmar by stating that the Yadana project has 
improved health and education facilities in the region and has also brought economic 
opportunities to over 40.000 people living in the pipeline area24.   
However, in practice, nothing has been done exactly in accordance with the 
wishes of the moral entrepreneurs. The company tried only to restore its public 
image, not by engaging in behavioral compliance but by engaging in “talk” through 
the internet. Many companies at least make minor instrumental adaptations; 
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however, Unocal did not feel the need to deal with the threat in this way, mainly 
because oil has few viable substitutes and also because the company did not have to 
come in direct contact with its consumers. This case differs from may other cases of 
CSR in this regard and is an important example to understand CSR. 
 
3. Nike – Bad Employee Practices  
 
Use of cheap labor is one of the areas in which public expectations and 
objections to exploitation have been growing in the last decades. Growing disparities 
among and within nations in terms of wealth and income is a growing concern, since 
this tends to bring underpaid workers into the spotlight as a point of comparison with 
senior-level company executives. NGOs pressuring of many well-known companies 
such as Nike to improve labor and wage conditions is another reason for this issue 
receiving worldwide notoriety. 
The main reasons for companies to globalize production is to remain 
competitive. Wages in Third World countries are much less than those in developed 
countries; therefore, it is profitable for a company to produce in these countries. 
Companies legitimize paying their workers very little, stating that they pay at least, if 
not more than minimum wage. However, although the minimum wage levels of the 
countries of production satisfy legal requirements, they do not seem to satisfy the 
international public. This fact makes Nike’s exploitation a good case to analyse with 
respect to Corporate Social Responsibility.  
Nike produces footwear, sports-clothing, equipment and accessories for the 
sports industry, and is the largest seller of these items across the world. It sells to 
approximately 19.000 retail accounts in the US and 140 countries in the world in 
                                                                                                                                                                    
24 http://www.unocal.com/myanmar  
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total. The company manufactures in countries such as China, Taiwan, Korea and 
Mexico25. Nike has about 700 contract factories around the world. The conditions of 
the workers in these factories have been subject to immense criticism.  
The behavior of Nike was defined as a problem activity when many TMEs, 
including UK-based Christian Aid and US-based National Labor Alliance, together 
with trade unions from developing countries, started to examine many sporting good 
corporations in the 1990’s fitting the description of sweatshop. Especially in training 
shoes, 99% of the production is in Asia. The products are usually differentiated on 
the basis of image and design rather than cost and quality. Therefore, the brand name 
and corporate image are very important for producers; and this makes this case a 
good one for analysing CSR, since the company is vulnerable to the costs of bad 
reputation, unlike Unocal. Christian Aid discovered that there were huge differences 
between the wages of the workers producing sportshoes and those of the high level 
executives of the company, even though the wages of the workers could easily be 
increased without significantly affecting the final price much26.  
 As the accusations began to register more strongly with Nike in the mid 
1990’s, they choose to go through the denial and justification phase concurrently. 
One important justification for paying wages much less than those of CEO’s or 
people that appear in Nike commercials was that the Nike workers were paid much 
better than the minimum wage in countries with severe unemployment. Nike also 
stated that the problem was not the business of NGO’s and they could only do harm 
to the people by interfering. Another argument was that Nike contributed to the 
development process in countries of East Asia and should thus be congratulated for 
                                                          
25 For details, check http://www.mallenbaker.net. 
26 Nike uses 1-2-4 pricing: product is bought from the factory at $20, retailer price is $40 and 
consumer price is $80, so the average labor cost of each is $1.44. This pricing system allows 
increasing the wages of the workers without affecting the final price much.  
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these contributions. This argument has been expressed by Steve Buckstein, the 
president of Cascade Policy: “Does anyone believe that once Nike leaves Indonesia, 
the country’s wage rates will plummet? No. Nike is part of the development process 
in Indonesia and other poor countries.”27 
Despite these justifications, a shaming phase was initiated by the NGO’s, 
who wanted to make the case known to the wide public. Their main claims were that, 
although Nike did pay relatively better wages, they marketed themselves as being the 
best anyway. Moreover, Nike was one of the companies where the difference 
between the wage of the worker and the boss was the greatest. It made sense that 
these companies moved from the countries where wage levels were rising to those 
whose wage levels were the lowest. This case is also important since it shows that 
whether contract employees or real employees are the subjects does not matter to the 
people anymore, since the people working for Nike sub-contractors were renounced 
as Nike workers. Moreover, it could not be a justification to say that Nike was 
relatively better than other jobs if it gave poor wages and provided bad working 
conditions. The public seemed to accept the views of the NGOs.  
In 1994, harsh criticism of company practices began to appear in leading 
newspapers and magazines such as Rolling Stone, The New York Times, Foreign 
Affairs, The Economist and in the BBC. In 1995, stories about Nike making gross 
profits by exploiting young women in Indonesia caused great media sensation. It was 
becoming difficult for the company to deny all criticisms against it.     
 Nike was still accused of bad labor conditions in 1998 when the company 
finally came to accept the accusations against the company and decided to negotiate. 
This is the structural adaptation phase. Philip Knight, the CEO of Nike, announced 
that Nike had not fully grasped the depth of public concern on worker exploitation 
                                                          
27 http://www.cascadepolicy.org/nike.html 
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and declared that the company would adopt new policies. He promised to bring new 
standards in overtime, wages, health and safety, worker conditions and child labor in 
line with the human rights standards. Knight also called for a change in corporate 
culture28, which seemed promising, as it could have signalled a movement towards 
institutionalization. Critics of Nike were rather skeptical of this speech; yet it was 
announced as a great victory by Nike. The speech seemed to promise many of the 
changes moral entrepreneurs had been pushing for. The material interests of Nike in 
doing this are obvious.    
However, these new changes did not address wage levels, which suggests that 
changes were made merely for structural reasons. The overall concern of the 
company seemed to be that the journalists and human rights activists uncovered their 
sweatshop conditions abroad. As long as the changes made remain at the 
instrumental adaptation phase, a true change towards norms of CSR being 
internalized cannot be expected. Nike engaged in speeches that affirmed its identity 
as a responsible corporate citizen and therefore led to the expectations that the 
company would change. However, the behavioral outcomes were not necessarily in 
line with the commissive speech act (Risse, 2000: 11).  
 In the Nike case, the White House interfered, organizing international 
organizations, apparel companies and concerned NGOs into the Apparel Industry 
Partnership (AIP). Its goal was to enforce existing codes of conduct, meaning that 
independent monitors would make unannounced visits and speak to the contractors 
worldwide directly. Moreover, as an antidote to “race to the bottom”, a 
differentiation was created between living wage and minimum wage, which may call 
for later legal adjustments.  
                                                          
28 For further details, check http://www.organicconsumers.com 
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Membership in AIP is voluntary and even existing members had problems 
with codes and monitoring requirements. However, it is expected that these sorts of 
monitoring incentives will make similar demands on other firms and noncompliance 
will become expensive over time. Only when standardized norms are taken as given, 
will the norm be truly internalised.  
 It became more or less clear that this was not the case with Nike when it was 
understood that in 2001, 3 years after the boycott’s renewal, Nike had fallen short in 
all 6 areas of proposed reform, according to a 115-page investigation. In addition, 
Nike provided very little information about working conditions. The company has 
created its own monitoring mechanisms to silence its critics as well. It was a co-
founder of Global Alliance29 and poured money to the Fair Labor Association, which 
both depend on Nike in their functions. Actually, the constant response of Nike to 
these crises was to give strength to its PR campaigns, this shows that there has been 
no real change in Nike’s identity or conceptualizations of interests, similar to the 
Nestlé case.   
The voices against Nike were heard again, with many TMEs renewing the 
Nike campaign. Nike chose to undertake a 3-billion-dollar media campaign this time 
to silence its critics once and for all. Although the company provided no proof that 
workplace conditions had improved and the promises of Knight were fulfilled, it was 
still selected as the most admired company in the apparel industry in February 2001 
and praised as an ethical company by Newsweek, Journal of Business Ethics and 
Business and Society. Less than a month ago, 300 striking workers in Allixco, 
Mexico had been attacked and beaten by local police. According to a BBC, 
harassment, poor wages and child labor were still common practices in host-country 
Cambodia. 
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It must be remembered that even as late as 1998, Knight had not promised 
decent wages and work conditions or respect for the free association of workers. The 
company has moved to the structural adaptation phase according to the Constructivist 
model; however, there is no sign that the norms of Corporate Social Responsibility 
will be internalized in the near future. It should not be forgotten that Nike has chosen 
to take steps only after considerable public pressure. The steps the company has 
taken are yet characterized by delays, lack of follow-through and failure to promote 
fair and free union elections, which increases doubts about the sincerity of the 
company.    
 
 4. Shell – Environmental Damages and Cooperation with “Bad” Governments 
 
Oil means incredible profits to some people; however, there is another side to 
the story, relating to the negative effects of oil companies and their presence in the 
oil-rich Third World countries. It is often a risky decision for oil companies to invest 
in the Third World, and it requires a great deal of responsible action on their part, 
both to avoid becoming subjected to public criticisms worldwide and also to avoid 
making the situation in the country worse. Most countries are led by corrupt 
authoritarian governments challenged by low economic development and violent 
conflicts. Environmental damages may lead to protest movements, which are often 
met by violent repression. Transboundary disputes with neighbors over oil resources 
is another dimension. The Shell case is a good example of the challenges facing an 
oil company operating in a Third World country, namely Nigeria.   
Shell is still dealing with the effects of the Ogoni crisis in Nigeria, where 
local people protesting against environmental degradation caused by Shell were 
                                                                                                                                                                    
29 Information about this foundation can be found at the website, http://www.theglobalalliance.org. 
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repressed, shot and even executed by the Nigerian government. The case of Shell is 
one of the best for analyzing the process of norms of Corporate Social Responsibility 
being incorporated by a transnational company as a result of certain events raising 
the attention of transnational moral entrepreneurs. This case not only is a very good 
example for understanding CSR but reflects the specific aspects of the oil sector in 
Third World countries, explaining why most “bad companies” under spotlight are oil 
companies.  
Shell started its operations in Nigeria in 1958 and remained in the country 
after independence two years later. Nigerian politics has been the scene to a power 
struggle between the three main ethnic groups, Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo, ever 
since, and smaller ethnic groups such as Ogoni have almost no say. The struggle 
among these three groups to gain access to profits of oil has contributed to military 
coups, and the country has seen only 10 years of civilian rule since 1960. 
Authoritarian military governments, such as the one headed by Babangida in 1993, 
the year when the protests against Shell in Ogoniland began, have generally ruled the 
country. Babangida called for elections in efforts of democratization in June 1993; 
however, this resulted in another military takeover in November led by General 
Abacha.  
Nigeria is the largest oil producing country in Africa and oil makes up about 
80% of the federal revenue in the country (Manby, 1999: 6). However, oil revenues 
enrich only a small minority which keeps its profits in banks of Switzerland, instead 
of the money being spent on education, health and other social investments. Politics 
have been totally corrupt, centered as they are on the volatile trade of oil. 
Multinational corporations often operated in joint ventures with the governments; 
therefore, they had the possibility to influence government policies and their 
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company policies and practices were important factors in official decision-making. 
Due to the disastrous economic policies of Abacha, the oil sector was the only one 
that had not collapsed at the outbreak of the crisis and therefore became even more 
crucial to the country’s economic prosperity. In this environment, each oil company 
that operated in Nigeria was under the spotlight. The corporations, as with Unocal in 
Myanmar, justified their presence by stating that they contributed to the development 
of the country, provided jobs and enhanced respect for human rights.  
The protests that broke out against Shell in 1993 were mainly about the 
environmental damages Shell had caused in the Ogoni region; an extraordinarily 
fertile place where people earned their lives from fishing and farming. In these lands, 
many oil spills, gas flares and air pollution were experienced and the reaction to 
these problems, if any, had been very slow. Water, air and soil was were becoming 
increasingly contaminated everyday. Since few Ogoni people were actually 
employed by Shell30, oil revenues did not mean much to the people of the region. 
Therefore, the presence of Shell meant almost exclusively disaster to the local 
people. The protestors wanted the company, which had refused to take any 
environmental measures in the past, to do something about the harm it had caused31. 
The protests were domestic in nature, before the presence of Shell in Nigeria became 
defined as a problem activity by transnational moral entrepreneurs.  
The Ogoni people decided that only organized action could produce desired 
results. For this purpose, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) 
was founded under the leadership of author, TV producer and journalist, Ken Saro- 
                                                          
30 Only 88 people were employed by Shell in 1996, which made 0.0002% of the Ogoni people. 
http://www.essentialaction.org/shell/issues.html  
31 One reason that transnational corporations choose to invest abroad is that they are subject to much 
less strict environmental laws. This mentality can be understood when the fact that Shell conducted 17 
different environmental surveys in the United Kingdom before construction is understood. No 
environmental impact assessments were seen necessary before starting operations in Nigeria. For 
further details, see http://www.ratical.org/corporations/OgoniFactS.html.  
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Wiwa. MOSOP organized its first protest in January 1993 with the participation of 
30,000 Ogonis. When a Shell worker was beaten the same month, Shell decided to 
withdraw its staff from Ogoni. The name of Saro-Wiwa was explicitly mentioned in 
a report given to the government by Shell.  
Another protest in April the same year ended when soldiers fired on the 
crowd, wounding 10. Four days later, an Ogoni worker was killed by soldiers and 
Saro-Wiwa’s passport was confiscated by the government. When Abacha assumed 
power in a military coup, the measures taken against MOSOP intensified and leaders 
of MOSOP were arrested, although they were released after weeks of protests. The 
Abacha regime soon turned its attention to the Ogoni people instead of on Saro-
Wiwa, attacking villages, killing people and burning down trees, while denying its 
involvement and descibing the situation as an Andoni-Ogoni conflict. A peace 
accord was signed at the end of these incidents, which also brought Shell back to 
Ogoniland. Protests continued. When it was understood that massive repression 
would not be enough to stop the protests, MOSOP leaders were targeted again. Wiwa 
and his friends were kept in prison without a specific charge for months, and Saro-
Wiwa was sentenced to death, without being granted a free trial. The executions took 
place in November 1995.  
After the execution of Wiwa, the problem became truly internationalized. 
These events led to massive protests by organizations such as Amnesty International, 
Greenpeace, Earthlife Africa and many others. The protests targeted Shell as well as 
the Nigerian government for being linked to the executions, for supplying the 
security forces with arms, for pressing the government to take measures against the 
protests that resulted in Wiwa and his friends being executed. Nigeria was suspended 
from the Commonwealth, although pleas from human rights activists in Nigeria and 
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abroad did not suffice to bring about its outright expulsion. Many country leaders 
condemned the trial for producing no direct evidence of Saro-Wiwa’s alleged crimes.  
Shell immediately denied its linkage to the events, and also denied that its 
operations led to environmental degradation, though it accepted that minor 
environmental problems did exist. The company attributed MOSOP’s complaint to 
government policies, thus denying its role in the crisis. 
The Shell campaign was one of the largest against a TNC. In addition to 
environmental charges, supporting repressive regimes was the second important 
criticism leveled against Shell. Besides engaging with the campaign, many groups, 
including Environmental Rights Action and Human Rights Watch went to the region 
to document the impact of oil companies in the Niger Delta. Although the 
demonstrations did not have any short-term negative effect on Shell’s stock prices 
and profits that year (1996), it had important implications for its reputation. In 
addition to protests and attacks against Shell’s retail outlets and consumer boycotts, 
there was widespread public and press comments that damaged the company’s 
image.  
This obviously bothered Shell, unlike Unocal, which was also vulnerable to 
the costs of reputation in terms of profits. The main criteria were satisfied for the 
norms to start becoming socialized by the company. The company was sensitive to 
the costs of bad reputation, local human rights activists existed and were organized, 
and international organizations and NGO’s supported these domestic groups, 
providing a permissive international structural context.  
These developments led Shell to the instrumental adaptation phase. We can 
understand that the concerns of Shell were once again structural in nature, since the 
company chose to spend millions of dollars on public relations campaigns and  
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favorable advertisement, in responding to the public demand for environmental 
justice in Ogoni. The company gave contributions to hospitals and schools. İn 
Nigeria, however, it did not fulfill the demands relating to the environment by local 
people. As the protests continued to grow, Shell later admitted supplying guns to the 
Nigerian military government at the time of the Ogoni crisis32. These changes 
stemming from material calculations were the first step towards the company 
accepting its role as a part of a normative structure. Moreover, adopting a written text 
shows that Shell has agreed to develop a new identity in language.  
One interesting development took place in 1998. As Shell understood that it 
had to strengthen contact with the protesters, it issued its first Social Responsibility 
Report in 1998, although the general response of the firm was to concentrate on PR. 
This means that norms of CSR were included in the corporate policies. Although this 
will seem like a smart PR move to many, and may be genuine, Shell accepting its 
responsibilities to the host communities it operates in is important, as it defines its 
role as a responsible actor in the community, although this role still comes second to 
its profit-making goal. Since a common base of norms is created for both sides, it 
will be easier to monitor whether Shell is complying with the norms or not.  
One important development for Nigeria was that military rule was abolished 
in 1999, inaugurating a peaceful transformation to a civilian government. Conditions 
have improved in Nigeria after the new president, Olesegun Obasanjo, came to 
power, promising to carry out many political changes.  
Legal means were also used in the Shell case. On 26 March 2001, the US 
Supreme Court ruled that families of the environmental activists executed in Nigeria 
could sue Shell in New York33. The suit alleged that Shell had taken land without 
                                                          
32 http://www.mcspotlight.org/beyond/companies/shell.html.  
33 For full text of the story, see http://www.bbc.co.uk, 27 March 2001 
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proper compensation, polluted the atmosphere and paid national security forces to 
suppress the boycotts. More importantly, Shell’s arguments that US federal courts 
lacked jurisdiction over violations of international law that occured abroad was 
rejected.   
 To what extent the language and practices of Shell intersect today is not yet 
certain. MOSOP and international NGOs have stated until recently that the company 
has not undertaken serious environmental reforms. However, Shell is still one of the 
firms that has shown a positive development in terms of accepting and implying the 
norms of Corporate Social Responsibility. 
  
5. Final Assessment 
The cases we have see above take into regard specific norms of CSR related 
to child labor, disinvestment, low wages and harmful marketing campaigns. In none 
of the cases do the companies think that they are committing harm on purpose. Some 
cases where the company is obviously guilty can be brought to the attention of the 
public much more easily in the context of already internalized norms such those 
repudiating torture, corruption and slave labor. Most companies do have mechanisms 
to identify a crisis before it starts. There is a problem when the company thinks its 
behavior is legal and appropriate.  
 If the phase of instrumental adaptation works with minor compensation and 
change, internalization will not take place. Only if the TNC starts seeing the 
accusations put against it as highlighting its internal problem, will a policy change 
take place. When the TNC tries to understand why something has arisen as a new 
problem, complex learning will begin, which may lead to a transformation of 
identities and interests.  
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 As bad examples become more visible, even companies that have not been 
affected in any way from these kinds of boycotts feel like they have to take 
measures. It is not easy to identify the risk of not applying responsible policies; 
therefore, firms such as Mars choose to abide by CSR policies. Almost every TNC 
has mentioned CSR now in its corporate reports or mission statements.  
 What can be understood from analysing these corporations analyzed is that 
most companies show similar reactions when they are expected to act in accordance 
with the norms of Corporate Social Responsibility. All the cases have choosen denial 
in the beginning, and all of them have chosen to deal with the problem by stating that 
they were responsible companies. This shows that companies understand the 
importance of being a responsible citizen today and even if they do not move much 
in this direction, they try to show the public that their identities have changed in the 
direction of being responsible corporate citizens who respect human rights and the 
environment, even in countries where they are not required to do so by law.  
 However, whether the company will also engage in behavioral outcomes 
largely depends on how much sensitive they are to reputational crisis. The Unocal 
case, where the transnational moral entrepreneurs could achieve few results was a 
good example in this respect. Whether the boycotts are supported by international 
organizations or not, and how well the boycotts are internally organized, are crucial 
factors.  
 Although most companies have verbally promised that they would become 
responsible corporate citizens and did show some corollary behavioral responses, a 
complete change in the identities of actors has not happened. Companies still solely 
define themselves as economic actors and most actions of CSR can be explained in 
terms of profits.  
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 One interesting point is that there is a potential for a legal framework to 
emerge in the future allowing companies to be sued for their malfeasance in the 
Third World. Although results have not been yet achieved until today, it is important 
that courts accept cases, such as those of Shell and Unocal. Since norms can be 
institutionalized through laws and formal monitoring mechanisms, legal 
developments are important. All the companies mentioned above participate in 
voluntary codes of conduct mentioned in chapter 2; however it is easy to see that 
compliance cannot be always accepted in these cases.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 83 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In this study, a Constructivist model has been used to understand the practical 
extent to which transnational corporations can internalize the notion of corporate 
social responsibility. In addition to using case studies to illuminate the concept 
better, the development of the concept and the emergence of the corporation as a 
moral actor has also been analyzed. 
 Businesses being responsible actors in their communities are trumpeted in 
newspapers, journals and company advertising itself. A notion of a socially 
responsible company respecting the rights of its employees, helping protect the 
environment, donating to humanitarian causes and participating in community 
projects such as building hospitals or opening schools is all too familiar now. But 
how seriously can one accept the reality of this notion? Throughout this paper, the 
answer to this question has been sought. 
 Although legal mechanisms exist to regulate behavior of TNCs, compliance 
with the norms of corporate social responsibility is mostly at the normative level. In 
the first chapter of this study, how a firm comes to comply with a norm without a 
legal mechanism has been studied. Constructivist studies taking “life-cycles” of 
norms, and focusing especially on human rights norms, have been taken as a 
reference point. Based on these studies, a step-by-step model starting from the 
emergence of norms and concluding at the point where they are fully recognized has 
been drawn. This model was applied to the cases of Shell, Nestlé, Nike and Unocal 
in the third chapter.  
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 The model starts by defining a norm as shared understandings of behavior, 
which informs actors what to do and not to do and also indicates under which 
situations the activity is defined as problematic and when it is permissible. Corporate 
social responsibility is taken as a norm which tells companies to respond to the needs 
of their community and to respect human rights and their host environment as well. 
Later, the process by which a norm emerges and become internalized is spelled out. 
Below are the conclusions reached by applying the model. 
As an activity starts to become defined as a problem, a weak domestic 
opposition emerges. If this opposition is supported by networks of transnational 
moral entrepreneurs, if the target actor is sensitive to costs of bad reputation, and if 
local human rights activists can get organized, a norm advocacy network comes into 
existence. All these criteria were satisfied in the case of Nestlé, Nike and Shell. 
However, since Unocal was not operating face-to-face with consumers, it was not 
affected as much by negative publicity. Apart from opening a web site describing its 
activities as legitimate, Unocal could deny the allegations. It did not even feel the 
need to make structural adaptations.  
 Companies usually choose denial as the first step, when an issue of 
wrongdoing is put on the agenda of the network, which, ironically, is the first stage 
of socialization, as a threat is recognized and defined. All companies, including 
Unocal felt the need to deny the accusations. The next stage is structural adaptation, 
as the company starts to understand that being shamed harms its immediate material 
interests. The cost to a TNC of being on the list of such a network is negative 
publicity, which in turn may negatively affect profits, the primary interest of the 
TNC. The identity of the company, at this stage, is still a profit-making entity. Nike, 
Nestlé and Shell were involved in community projects, tried to show the media that 
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they were actually responsible companies and also hired PR experts to control 
negative publicity. However, at this stage, the actual wishes of the networks were not 
satisfied, and almost all boycotts are still active, though their strength has decreased 
over time.  
 Socialization starts when TNCs take these norms into higher regard in their 
practices. The reformation of the interests and identities of the actors is important at 
this stage, when fixed preferences are problematized. If the profit-maximizing firm 
that defines itself solely as a economic actor comes to include social roles in this 
identity as well, the reformation has been successful. All three companies published 
corporate codes of conduct and also became parts of various business partnerships 
and the UN Global Compact as well. This shows that businesses have at least agreed 
that these responsibilities can be expected of them, although not necessarily heading 
them into practice.  
This study has shown us that most corporations have reached but not 
surpassed this stage, and the norm of corporate responsibility has thus not been 
internalized. For internalization to take place, voluntary codes of conduct that are 
usually accepted by shamed companies have to be translated into legal regulations. 
However, voluntary codes define ethical behavior.   
At the last stage, norm compliance becomes habitual, identities and interests 
are redefined to include the norm and therefore, a normative structure comes into 
existence. This normative structure has to be codified in laws and regulations for 
complete internalization to occur. Since no international law that exists today backs 
CSR with sanctions, the life-cycle of the norm remains incomplete even before 
analyzing actual behavior in case studies. Corporations cannot issue laws like states 
and the codes of conducts they promise to adhere to are voluntary in nature. 
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Therefore, a norm can be internalized for corporations in laws and regulations only 
with the help of the state. Although in developed countries, some corporations have 
been tried for abusing human rights, such as Unocal and Shell, this is not the issue in 
developing states.          
 In addition to these theoretical parts and case studies, the role of the 
corporation as a moral actor, legal implications and the actual meaning of corporate 
social responsibility has also been analyzed. The corporation has been taken as a 
moral actor, as corporate social responsibility gives them nonlegal responsibilities. 
The scope of the norm, based on the analysis of the codes of various TNCs as well as 
those created by business partnerships and international organizations, covers 
employee and labor rights, environmental protection, social development, diversity 
and respect for human rights. Since companies have included these terms into their 
discourse, it can be concluded that they accept the presence of the norms, no matter 
how much they view compliance as a publicity campaign.   
 Finally, it can be said that although there have been positive developments on 
businesses accepting and implementing norms of social responsibility, these efforts 
on part of corporations are still structural in nature, and they still elevate profits over 
human rights considerations. This should not be expected to change in the near 
future; apart from the companies themselves, institutions dealing with them do tend 
not to disregard their profit making identity. Those who treat the corporation as a 
philanthropic institution will therefore be approached with scepticism. Shell is an 
interesting case among the others since it manifests its “responsible” identity in all its 
commercials, making it hard to deny potential allegations. However, Shell is a 
company that has suffered the costs of negative publicity the most, and even this 
manifestation of identity can be seen as a PR activity.  
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 Most companies approach corporate social responsibility from a structural 
point of view. However, this does not mean that all the literature of corporate 
responsibility has proved to be false. There is still a possibility for the “language” to 
transform into practice and become habitualized, although defined in terms of profit. 
As long as there is no internalization and identity change, businesses are likely to 
comply with these norms only as long as they believe in the profitability.  
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